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Abstract 
This thesis examines historical writing by drawing on the works of historians, 
philosophers, theorists and intellectuals, from antiquity to the contemporary moment. In 
order to answer the demand for scholarship that assembles insights of the Annales 
historians with other French intellectuals, I treat historians as theorists and theorists as 
historians. Through the course of my analysis, I examine issues of historical writing such 
as the scope of historical research and the historian’s task and place; I treat theoretical 
questions of constructivism, potentiality, agency, causality, teleology, and politics. In 
order to consolidate these issues into a single analysis, my research spans across 
disciplinary boundaries. Through an engagement with the methodological and political 
criticisms of Michel Foucault and Jacques Rancière, I argue in favor of an archival 
research method that avoids the pitfalls of positivistic analysis and the excesses of 
procedural refinement, which often serve to narrow the scope of historical research.  
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Introduction: History and Theory 
 
 The subject of this thesis is historiography: problems that relate to historical 
writing and satisfactory historical explanation. In so doing, I aimed to avoid the 
relativistic conclusions of theorists such as Keith Jenkins, and to write about the 
philosophy of history without focusing on Hegel’s system. This thesis contains a 
conceptual history of “the event,” tracing the roots of this concept to a group of 
historians known as the Annales. Further, I claim to develop an analytic using the 
categories of the philosophy of history to analyze the politics of historiography. 
This thesis began as an analysis of ‘historical theory,’ with the hopes of either 
encountering or developing a philosophy of history both relevant to political and social 
problems and conversant with the fashionable lines of contemporary academic inquiry.  
This hope was quickly tempered, and piece by piece, a research agenda congealed 
around my readings. Through the course of my analysis, I propose to consolidate the 
issues raised by disciplinary boundaries that threatened historical research and the self-
reflexive auto critique familiar to Anglophone scholars under the heading of “French 
Theory.” Through the course of my analysis, I examine issues of historical writing such 
as the scope of historical research and the historian’s task and place; I treat theoretical 
questions of constructivism, potentiality, agency, causality, teleology, and politics. 
Further, through an engagement with the methodological and political criticisms of 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Rancière, I argue in favor of an archival research method 
which avoids the pitfalls of positivistic analysis and the excesses of procedural 
refinement, so that the object of historical research might be given new life through the 
principles of historical reconstruction. 
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Two turning points of my research seem especially pertinent. First, as I initially 
set out to understand historiography as a field that developed from ancient insight and 
slowly became the modern form we know today, I took the object of my study as the 
history of historiographic statements from Herodotus onwards.  In the first summer of 
my research, I was struck by the following passage of John Burrow’s discussion of 
Thucydides found in A History of Histories, where he writes:  
Historians, one is glad to be able to assert, have generally done better 
than their programmatic formulations of their task have suggested, which 
is one reason why discussions of the nature of historiography based on 
such formulations are so inadequate. (Burrow, 49) 
In my estimation, this passage undercuts a fair amount of academic commentaries, 
which focus on the programmatic statements of historians and attempt to judge their 
merit on these sorts of statements. An example would be Thucydides’ commentary on 
the ancient convention of developing speeches for historical figures in which he claimed 
“to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation” 
(Thucydides, 1.22, p. 47).  
Generally speaking, such programmatic statements are more of interest to 
philosophers than they are to historians.  Many analytical philosophers have attempted 
to demonstrate that historians lacked the epistemic justification for their claims, and 
these efforts were generally ignored by practicing historians. Often, this is for good 
reason. A survey of the 1962 Symposium Philosophy and History, edited by Sidney Hook, 
is rife with unflattering portraits. Ernest Negal demonstrates the sort of condescension 
with which philosophers have regarded historians:  
Like other intellectual workers, professional historians are rarely self-
conscious about the organizing concepts of the principles for assessing 
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evidence which they habitually employ in their discipline… When 
historians do express themselves on such issues, they are therefore likely 
to voice philosophical ideas imbibed by chance during their school days 
or in their desultory reading, but which they have seldom subjected to 
rigorous criticism in the light of their own professional experience. 
(Negal, 76) 
As John Zammito, in A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, writes, 
this issue of philosophers asserting the naivety of historians has become somewhat a 
perennial problem between the disciplines: 
A consideration of the last century shows repeated instances of 
philosophy coming forward to serve as conceptual warden for 
historiography, uninvited and unappreciated by historians. In the last 
decades a similar intervention has arisen from literary “theory,” and, 
again, historiography has been “invited” to construe its disciplinary 
practice under the auspices of another. (Zammito, 64)  
In writing this thesis, I attempted to apply Burrow’s caveat; I also do not take the 
programmatic statements of historians at their word, or attempt to develop a “theory” of 
history that ought to supervise historians at work. Nevertheless, I have strong interests 
in problems of historical method, and sought to apply these interests within the present 
work in a fashion more amenable to the practical conditions of writing history, or, in a 
word, historiography.  
 I trust that the above controversy is reason enough to explain why I centered the 
first chapter on the conflict of the faculties within the social sciences and the humanities. 
Why, however, did I choose to focus almost exclusively on French sources? Here, I must 
acknowledge a debt to the works of Paul Ricœur. 
The most stimulating piece of my early research was Ricœur’s Zararoff Lecture 
for 1978-9, “The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History,” not 
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only due to my nostalgia for the city of spires. I found Ricœur’s account rife with 
references to the primary works of historians, especially of the Annales, put into 
conversation, rather than into opposition, with the works of philosophers such as Robert 
Mandrou. There I found a model of the scholarship needed within what is known as 
historical theory, following the suggestive works of scholars such as Reinhardt 
Koselleck. The scene of Anglophone scholarship, laden with demands for certainty and 
finality in historical judgement, often contains condescension towards historians that in 
turn fuels historians’ antipathy towards the philosophy of history. Where the 
Anglophone analytical philosophy of history perpetuated an opposition between 
historians and philosophers, Parisian intellectuals promoted synthetic and accumulative 
analyses, in which the distinction between historian and theorist was happily blurred. 
While Ricœur alerted me to a wealth of sources, and in that respect, shaped the 
course of my analysis, I did take pains to ensure that our works did not overlap. Instead, 
I took my locus to be within the shadow of magisterial analyses such as Memory, History, 
Forgetting and Time and Narrative. I found the sections on some theorists, such as Michel 
Foucault and Jacques Rancière, to be suggestive but in need of narrower and more 
extensive controversy.  
Perhaps, in many respects, this narrowing field of focus resulted in fashioning a 
pair of blinders in the course of my analyses. In some respects, I cannot doubt that this 
occurred, and will address these myriad inadequacies in my conclusion. I would like to 
think that in some instances, the fault lies with the contemporary state of academic 
conventions, which promotes singular efforts on the part of academics, rather than 
group or team based research. There is no substitution for well written analyses when 
one intends to venture deeply into the clefts and secret places of the archive. With the 
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works of Ricœur I would also add Martin Kusch’s Foucault’s Strata and Fields; the works 
of Peter Burke, especially New Perspectives on Historical Writing and The French Historical 
Revolution. The most stimulating primary sources were the works of Roger Chartier, as 
well as the collection by Jacques Revel and Lynn Hunt, Histories: French Constructions of 
the Past, which contains a wealth of primary source material for those interested in 
furthering or surpassing my research.  I am indebted to the attention of my superiors, as 
well as my colleges, as each conversation was precious and enriching.  
I ask pardon from my readers for my anecdotes. The above was written in order 
to elucidate my initial choice of subject material and organization, which might 
otherwise appear idiosyncratic. This glimpse is not intended to justify my project, 
though, I must add that the interior resources developed through experience require 
expression to foster empathy. Without respect and mutual trust, what would a 
community of scholars be but a “band of thieves”? (De civitate dei, IV, 4). By advocating 
for the relevance of experience, I do not intend to present them in the absence of 
rigorous conceptual supplement. 
Having indicated that Burrow’s caveat altered the course of my analysis, we now 
turn to the place of theoretical historiographic observations within Theory and 
Continental Philosophy. In Telling the Truth about History, we read: 
New cultural theories, including postmodernist ones, have helped, like 
their predecessors, to revitalize discussion about methods, goals and even 
the foundations of knowledge. Provocative and unsettling, they raise 
questions that demand some new answers. (Appleby et al, 305)  
Partially, my agenda was to highlight the unsettling and provocative claims of 
historians, which, subjected to the cyclic oscillations of intellectual history, have fallen 
out of academic fashion (Ziolkowski, 199). Readers of Theory and philosophy will be 
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familiar with the contemporary resurgence of interest of the concept of “the event,” for 
example, in the works of Martin Heidegger or Alain Badiou. Invoking “the event” 
typically connotes a rupture of temporal continuity, whether this is a prognostic percept 
or an ex post facto excavation. Part of this thesis is a conceptual history of “the event” 
which traces its prominence to the Annales historians, who sought to undermine event-
based histories. It must be noted, however, that my analysis is not simply a ‘search for 
origins,’ of a fashionable concept. Instead, by analyzing the manner in which historians 
such as Bloch and Febvre crafted histories that either had no pivotal events or focused 
on the effects of events which did not occur. For historians, such works inaugurate a 
shift that can be understood as a movement away from empirically verifiable 
phenomena in their documented actuality, and towards an architectonic of possibility. 
This new history reinvigorated old controversies. For example, histories that develop 
these architectonics of possibility, such as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s Montaillou: The 
Promised Land of Error, present the reader with a collection of possible configurations as a 
more or less closed system. Such sections beg the question of determination; are these 
caches deterministic, like laws, or variable generalizations? Here, the distinction 
between nomothetic and idiographic explanation takes on a new importance. New 
techniques of historical writing reinvigorate the use of concepts from the philosophy of 
history as analytic tools.  
Within this thesis, concepts from the philosophy of history are generally used as 
analytics, as I saw fit to limit my analysis to the question of historical writing. Questions 
of the ontological or epistemic status of the past, the traditional fare of the philosophy of 
history, were beyond the scope of my analysis. Partially, this choice reflects my own 
conviction that such questions beg extremes, and for that reason, have little relevance for 
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historians. Whether the past is absolutely real or irrevocably lost is of little concern to 
that fact that various text effects have enabled historians to produce works that grant us 
insight into the remote past. How exactly these effects are possible, and the truth status 
of these text effects, are both matters of hermeneutics, which would require 
consolidating the exegetical and speculative methods of philosophy with historical 
material. While this appeared promising to me at first glance, the idea of a singular 
theory of history seems to beg many questions best characterized as epistemological in 
nature, which would center the concerns of philosophers over and against those of 
historians.  
Of course, I do not intend to draw a strict division between philosophical and 
historical justifications. My reading of the Annales demonstrates that while these 
historians were engaged in the reinvigoration of historical study, they did so by way of 
philosophical justifications. These justifications were neither epistemological nor 
ontological, as many positivistic justifications are, but rather methodological and 
political. Historians such as Braudel offer methodological justifications of historical 
practice, such as his theory of temporal stratification, which entailed that history takes 
place at three levels, the short term, the conjunctural and the long term, immobile 
history of geographic and meteorological change. Such a justification supports a “clear 
hierarchy of explanation,” yet depends on a notion of duration, which becomes the 
subject of Foucault’s critique (Appleby et al, 308). Historians such as Jules Michelet and 
Lucien Febvre offered political justifications for their works, especially in regards to the 
“history from below,” accounts which focus on popular culture, demographic, economic 
and material realities of subaltern groups. 
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Subsequent chapters focus on the theoretical contributions of Michel Foucault, 
and then Jacques Rancière, whom I consider to be historians in their own right. In their 
own way, these figures enable us to distance our account of historiography from 
hermeneutic concerns which would resolve in ontological and epistemological 
statements, in order to promote a more tempered balance between the nomothetic and 
idiographic aspects of historical inquiry. Their engagement with the methodological and 
political justifications of the Annales enables us to further enquire into the political, as 
well as the text effects or poetic aspects, of historiography. However, the most direct 
reason for reading these thinkers together is the fact that neither allows his thought on 
history to lapse into a unity in the manner characteristic of what is typically invoked by 
the phrase ‘philosophy of history.’ To oversimplify the point, each in his own way 
succeeds in affirming some multiplicity over transcendental unity. 
Foucault’s archeological method is indebted to the contributions of the Annales. 
He argues in favor of a more radical application of the notion of duration to the concept 
of event. In doing so, Foucault attempts to suppress a number of historiographic themes 
and conventions associated with Hegelian dialectics, such as teleology and progressive 
development. Foucault advocates for a non-teleological historiography, in which the 
past is not an origin of the present, but a terminus in its own right. Foucault proceeds 
primarily by detaching historiography from its humanistic commitments, and in doing 
so, does not develop a convincing account of politics. 
Where Foucault’s contributions fall short, Rancie ̀re’s intervention begins. I focus 
on his interrogation of the political justifications offered by the Annales. Rancière’s 
radical critique attempts to subvert the logic of representation, both poetic and political. 
Where Aristotle’s Poetics defines poetics as mimesis, Rancière advances a non-mimetic 
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theory of poetics in order to undermine the connection between political representation 
and political credential. Where the “history from below” is justified by practitioners as 
an extension of real political representation, Rancie ̀re argues that the historian presents 
the subaltern, specifically the poor, as objects through scientific means such as 
demography and economics. Rancière’s intervention is especially pertinent in that it 
allows us to connect the issues of historiographic reconstruction with the political 
currency proposed therein.   
In assessing the contributions of Foucault, I argue that we ought to apply the 
analytic of nomothetic and idiographic concepts. Ultimately I claim that Foucault’s 
archeological method overemphasizes the constraints of law and structure, and has 
difficulty accounting for diachronic change, due to his abandonment of the logic of 
causality. In assessing the contributions of Rancière, I argue that his promotion of the 
voices of the past, à la Michelet, risks re-establishing some poetic conventions of 
positivism. 
As it stands, this thesis complements my undergraduate work on the German 
tradition of the critical philosophy of history. While my interest in learning more about 
recent and contemporary French historiography was a driving force for my research, 
this interest cannot provide a justification for my study. My intent for providing these 
careful readings is therefore to attest to the importance of historical theory for 
considering theoretical problems such as “the event,” potentiality, causality, and 
political and mimetic representation. History, practiced as a tempered balance between 
nomothetic and idiographic methods, houses unique scenarios of enormous pedagogic 
worth. It is my conviction that historiography represents what we could call a “minor 
literature” typically neglected by scholars, even within interdisciplinary fields such as 
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Theory and Criticism.  Renewed interest and attention to these archives will grant new 
sense and direction to scholars working on similar problems.  
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Chapter 1: The Historiography of the Annales Historians 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Guzzi 12 
 
 
Part of my agenda in this chapter is to fill the gaps in scholarship about the 
theoretical contributions of the Annales. Scholarship on the theoretical import of the 
Annales historians has been formalized in its Anglophone reception. Typical accounts 
focus on an “Annales paradigm” or offer Braudel’s ideas of temporal stratification. In 
such accounts the work of one historian is thought sufficient to explain the work of the 
group and its affiliates—a reductive approach which fails to contextualize the 
historiographic theories of the Annalistes with other developments of interest to 
Anglophone scholars. 
 This chapter presents several trajectories of the Annales School that are pertinent 
to our discussion of historiography in French Theory, which include the problems of 
interdisciplinary research, structure, and method. These issues are explored with 
reference to the antimony between idiographic and nomothetic analysis, the questions 
raised by (relatively) novel areas of historical research, the controversy between older 
methods and the incorporation of scientific data, and the fascinating and challenging 
histoire des mentalités. This chapter establishes a number of basic terminological and 
factual aspects of later chapters, and for that reason, consists of a synthetic survey of a 
large number of historical works.  
 
The Methodenstreit and Positivism 
During the 20th century, the French academy underwent a massive reshuffling of 
the disciplines, resultant from the development of new fields such as anthropology and 
sociology. Immanuel Wallerstein, in his “Annales: The War on Two Fronts,” argues that 
the Annales were engaged in “the Methodenstreit … the ostensibly central debate of late 
nineteenth century social science… the conflict between the so-called nomothetic and 
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idiographic approaches to the study of man and society” (Wallerstein, 85). During this 
time, sociology, anthropology, psychology and other emergent fields produced 
apologetics: texts defining each field’s preview within the academy. These texts expound 
methodological justifications, and often attempt to sequester the various disciplines. I 
argue that the institutional form of history resulting from these sectarian debates 
inspired the theoretical innovations of Annales historians, who could be credited with a 
revitalization of the discipline of history in the 20th century. Most Annales historians did 
not explicitly theorize their practice. In this introductory chapter, we will analyze some 
of the rare and influential theoretical considerations of Annalistes in the context of this 
conflict of the faculties over method. 
Prominent anthropologists and sociologists, in an attempt to secure the place of 
their fields within the social sciences, wrote apologetics that expounded methodological 
justifications. An example of an apologetic attempt to define the field can be found in 
Lévi-Strauss’ Structural Anthropology, where Lévi-Strauss opposes history to sociology, 
presenting sociology as a nomothetic field and history as an idiographic field. Lévi-
Strauss argues that historians produce “documentary and functional” observations – not 
“comparative” studies (Lévi-Strauss, 1). The idiographic view of history privileges 
political and narrative histories insofar as they study unique historical objects, for 
example, contingent trains of events. On similar terms, Émile Durkheim writes that  
History can only be a science on condition that it raises itself above the 
particular, but then it is the case that it ceases to be itself, and becomes a 
branch of sociology… history can remain a distinct discipline only if it 
confines itself to the study of each individual nation, taken by itself, and 
considered at the different moments of its development. (Durkheim, 78)  
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Exclusive focus on the unique and singular aspects of history denies the incorporation of 
structural elements into historical accounts. Durkheim considered these structures to be 
the prerogative of ethnography. If this were so, both Marxist style recourse to economic 
and social structure, as well as cultural history in the style of Jules Michelet or Fustel de 
Coulanges would be ousted from the domain of legitimate historical explanation. 
At first glance, the difference between the idiographic and nomothetic study 
would appear to lie in the choice of historical object, but each actually would privilege a 
different kind of explanation. The former, intent on describing non-repeatable sequences 
of events, has recourse to the agency of historical actors in explanation. The latter, intent 
on describing serial and immobile historical structures, has recourse to structural 
constraints on agents and historical forces. Two competing explanations could be 
developed for the same event along these lines. Did ‘orders arrive late from Madrid 
because Philip II could not make up his mind what to do’ – or – did ‘orders arrive late 
from Madrid because sixteenth century ships took several weeks to cross the 
Mediterranean’ (Burke, 236)? Hopefully, a proper resolution would recognize that both 
structural and agentic variables are important considerations for historical explanation, 
and neither could be preferred to the other in all cases1. Looked at from the perspective 
of historical writing, the idiographic-nomothetic antimony results in competing forms of 
explanation, however, the mutual exclusivity of these forms of explanation ought to be 
considered an exaggerated result of the conflict of faculties.  History as a discipline does 
not benefit from being pigeonholed in either camp.  
                                                          
1 See Giddens, Anthony. "Elements of the Theory of Structuration." The Constitution of Society: 
Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity, 1984, 1-34. 
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Given how artificial the nomothetic-idiographic distinction is for historiography, 
the Annales historians fought what Wallerstein referred to as “a war on two fronts.”  The 
journal Annales d’histoire économique et sociale was a zone of contention and is 
retrospectively considered to be “the single most important forum for the revitalization 
of historical studies in the Western world” (Hughes, 19). Whereas the Annalistes were 
famously polemical, and interested in engaging these new debates, other historians 
attempted to secure the place of academic history by developing it as a science. A 
codified method for training historians is exemplified by Charles-Victor Langlois and 
Charles Seignobos’ Introduction aux études historiques of 1898 (Revel, 6).  The positivistic 
view of history remains important as a foil against which to situate our observations 
about Annales historiographic theory.   
Our treatment of positivism is twofold. First, I will present some aspects of the 
positivism of Henry Thomas Buckle, whose reflections offer insight into positivism as a 
historical research agenda. Next, in order to connect our reflections to the French 
academic scene, we will briefly attend to the école méthodique that rose to prominence 
between 1860 and 1914.  
Henry Thomas Buckle’s History of Civilization in England (1851-1861) begins with 
an overview of his research agenda, which proposes to apply positivist philosophy to 
the study of history. Several points of his agenda are relevant to our understanding of 
positivism as a historical research agenda. Buckle aims to model history on natural 
science:  
I hope to accomplish for the history of man something equivalent, or at 
all events analogous, to what has been effected by other inquirers for the 
different branches of natural science. In regards to nature, events 
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apparently the most irregular and capricious have been explained, and 
have been shown to be in accordance with certain fixed and universal 
laws. This has been done because men of ability… have studied natural 
events with the view of discovering their regularity: and if human events 
were subjected to similar treatment, we have every right to expect similar 
results. (Buckle, 125) 
As a doctrine, historical positivism aims to find order and regularity in the apparent 
disorder of historical phenomena, development and trends. For this purpose, it adopts 
the methodology of natural science insofar as this is possible (some aspects of the 
scientific method, like experimentation, cannot be applied to historical study). It is 
important for our purposes to recognize that historical positivism, by having a general 
research method, does not analyze particular problems raised by historical material. By 
this, I mean to oppose the problem oriented historical research of the Annales with the 
nomothetic research agenda of historical positivism. A further significant difference is 
found in Buckle’s claim that historical “observations are more liable to those causes of 
error which arise from prejudice and passion” (Buckle 125). In other words, the opinions 
of the historian ought not to enter into her research, according to Buckle and other 
positivists.  
 While Buckle has been useful as a source for the doctrine of historical positivism, 
his work did not occasion the Annales in the manner that French historians did. Further, 
French historical positivism has notable conceptual differences from English historical 
positivism. However, the “positivist” label is contested in scholarly research, as it was 
applied, primarily by the Annales, retrospectively to a group of historians. The Annales 
School: An Intellectual History by André Burguière contains a section entitled “Did the 
Positivist Turn of French Historians Exist?”. Burguière demonstrates that the historians 
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later branded “positivist” were also motivated by the increasing influence of sociology 
in the French academy, and fought the annexation of history by “laying claim to a risky 
epistemological singularity, that of being the science of what occurs only once” 
(Burguière, 62). However, the hegemony of these historians over the entirety of the 
French academic scene was exaggerated by Febvre and other first generation Annalistes.  
 Isabel Noronha-Divanna, in Writing History in the Third Republic, claims that these 
French “positivists” ought to be known as école méthodique historians, which includes 
Hippolyte Taine, Ernest Renan, Fustel de Coulanges, Gabriel Monod, Ernest Lavisse, 
Charles-Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos (Noronha-Divanna, 3). Historians of the 
école méthodique rose to prominence between 1860 and 1914, and sought a scientific 
method for history which would eliminate disagreement and promote unity at the 
national political level (Noronha-Divanna, 29). She writes: 
After 1870, four elements of history-writing in the Third Republic can be 
seen as key to understanding the new positivistic attitude towards 
history: a heightened concern for explaining the role of history as an 
instrument of the state; an effort to secularize education; thirdly, 
nationalism replacing cosmopolitanism in Parisian academia; fourthly, a 
rejection of German scholarship in dealing with historical sources and 
facts. (Noronha-Divanna, 35)  
These features of historical positivism were particular to French historians, who, unlike 
English historians such as Buckle, were at pains to distinguish their methods from 
sociology, and German historical scholarship. In its French iteration, the école méthodique 
variety of positivism narrowed the scope of historical research, in an attempt to secure 
ground from sociology. In connecting history with the state, the école méthodique contains 
a political orientation which further narrows the subject matter of history. Along with 
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narrowing the field of possible research, the école méthodique has implications for the role 
of the historian, which are important for our consideration of the Annalistes response.  
Carrard, in Poetics of the New History, presents a perspective of the positivistic 
view, which suggests that the role of the historian is to act as an arbiter between 
documents and facts, given their condemnation of “personal, patriotic, moral or 
metaphysical considerations” in historical writing (Carrad, 7). In other words, the 
positivistic historian attempted to refrain from sharing insight or conviction, in order to 
downplay authorial intrusion. Further, these historians “prescribe the observation of 
chronological order” as a principle of historiography (Carrad, 7).  Such considerations 
inadvertently narrow the scope of possible historical research to well documented 
periods and events. While this may seem trivial, the artificial demand for this type of 
evidence privileges an entire set of historical circumstances – the literacy of the 
monasteries and upper classes, and the importance of urban places over, for example, 
rural settings. The Annales historians fought in favor of these innovations, though there 
is no Annales manual,2 some theoretical synthesis of myriad innovations. Instead, 
throughout the rest of the chapter, I will analyze the theoretical aspects of the work of 
Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, Fernand Braudel, Jacques Le Goff, and Phillippe Ariès. 
Marc Bloch and Fernand Braudel: Structure and Method 
The oeuvre of Marc Bloch attests to a set of principles that informed his work. 
These principles include authorial intervention, an expanded sense of evidence and the 
use of ad hoc hermeneutic methods. In sum, these principles result in a non-positivistic 
historiography. Where positivist historiography relies on the ‘discovery’ of historical 
                                                          
2 Braudel’s attempt at a textbook, A History of Civilization did not become incorporated into the 
French academy.  
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facts, Bloch’s work attests to the alternative notion that historical facts are constructed. 
Further, Bloch’s historiography is far from documentary positivism, in that it promotes 
new areas of research, such as agrarian history. While Bloch never authored an explicitly 
theoretical text, his reflections on historical writing were recorded in his unfinished 
Apologie pour l’historie, ou Métier d’historien, or in English: The Historian’s Craft.  
In The Historian’s Craft, Bloch makes no secret of the fact that he considers 
historians to be more than arbiters of facts; as he puts it, “the historian is not… that 
rather grumpy examining magistrate whose unfaltering portrait is easily imposed upon 
the unwary by certain introductory manuals” (HC, 90). Verification of primary sources, 
as positivists suggest, is only one feature of historical research, which requires an 
extraneous set of questions in order to be a meaningful exercise. Documentary evidence 
is not limited to the surface claims of documentary materials. Bloch writes that “because 
history has tended to make more and more frequent use of unintentional evidence, it can 
no longer confine itself to weighing the explicit assertions of the documents. It has been 
necessary to wring from them further confessions which they had never intended to 
give” (HC, 89). In his The Judge and the Historian, Carlo Ginzburg claims that Bloch and 
Febvre proved, contrary to their positivist contemporaries, that “nonexistent phenomena 
and falsified documents” are of historical importance. In fact, nonexistent phenomena 
feature prominently in Bloch’s The Royal Touch. How could non-existent phenomena be 
the subject of historical intrigue? Ginzburg writes that “the nonexistence of the bands of 
brigands renders more significant (because more profound and revealing) the fear that 
spread among the French peasants in the summer of 1789” (Ginzburg, 17). The methods 
for exploring possibilities within a specific historical locale will be returned to later in 
this chapter.   
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Within Bloch’s works the use of evidence is likened to the use of testimony – in 
all its uncertainties and heteroglossia - which Bloch calls the ‘dialectic of the criticism of 
testimony’ (HC, 110). Here the applications of techniques perfected by previous scholars 
are apparent. Were we to search for an Ur-text, Spinoza’s biblical exegesis in Theological-
Political Treatise or Vico’s discovery of the true Homer in The New Science  both use 
critical documentary analysis on the explicit statements within the texts in question. In 
either case, the document is submitted to an internal analysis, which Bloch uses the 
phrase “psychological analysis” to denote. Such psychological analysis of texts 
“conforms to no mechanical rules,” and so cannot be reduced to formulaic method (HC, 
111). Whereas the positivistic views that Bloch reacts against attempt to impose a 
method uniformly across all documentary materials, Bloch himself confirms the 
importance of hermeneutic approaches to idiographic analysis, performed on the basis 
of an operative set of questions the historian brings to the document in question. The ad 
hoc method is an example of the historian’s authorial intervention into the archive. 
Agrarian history is precisely the sort of inquiry which troubled the 
methodological commitments of positivistic history qua documentary analysis. In French 
Rural History, Bloch develops a method suitable to the historical object in question, a 
regressive method that proceeds from knowns to unknowns:  
When Durkheim was embarking on a course of lectures on the family he 
once said ‘to understand the past one must first leave it’. That is true. But 
it can also happen that one must first look at the present in order to 
understand the past… this is the method imposed on agrarian studies by 
the present state of evidence. (FRH, xxvi)  
Agrarian history requires methods which work against the flow of time, and which 
often work in the absence of documentary evidence. In an informative anecdote, Bloch 
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refers to a letter to Fustel de Coulanges in which an English historian asked him whether 
France ever had “the open field system with long furlongs” common to England. Fustel 
De Coulanges answered in the negative, and incorrectly, Bloch speculates, due to his 
exclusive reliance on the testimony found in documents. Bloch writes, “it is quite 
probable that he never took any special notice of the characteristic pattern of plough-
lands visible all over northern and eastern France which so irresistibly call to mind the 
open-fields of England” (FRH, xxvii). In this case, seeking the origin or root cause in 
ancient documents is a much less effective method than comparing the field structures 
against English examples, or, as Bloch did, consulting survey officials (FRH, 59). Bloch’s 
expanded sense of suitable evidence for historical inquiry challenges the patient 
documentary style of history common to traditional historical themes of nation state and 
politics.  
As the anecdote illustrates, Bloch used material evidence as a supplement to 
documentary evidence. An example of material evidence can be found in French Rural 
History, where Bloch compares two systems: open and enclosed fields. Of the closed 
fields, he writes, “as in the regions of open-fields, these material manifestations were the 
outward expression of underlying social realities” (FRH, 57).  These underlying social 
realities are obscure due to the fact that they were scarcely written about. In Bloch’s 
work, material becomes the historian’s trace of underlying social realities, which are not 
chronologically reconstructed - but understood as attesting to structural possibilities 
within the two regimes, which were governed by distinct attitudes. Bloch’s work on 
agrarian history is an exemplary use of indirect evidence from historical sources. Within 
the Annales trajectory, Bloch’s theoretical contributions were practiced without 
armature, hence relatively unpretentious.  
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Braudel’s contribution to the ‘war on two fronts’ was backed by a distinct 
theoretical armature: his theory of temporal stratification. Simply put, Braudel 
distinguished multiple senses of time, which he differentiated with recourse to temporal 
duration. Through his theory of temporal stratification, Braudel elaborates a research 
agenda which seeks to combine both nomothetic and idiographic observation. In doing 
so, he overcomes the antimony, at least from the perspective of historical writing. He 
writes in History and Sociology that  
History exists at different levels, I would even go as far as to say three 
levels… on the surface, the history of events works itself out in the short 
term: it is a sort of microhistory. Halfway down, a history of conjunctures 
follows a broader, slower rhythm… and over and above the ‘recitatif’ of 
the conjuncture, structural history, or the history of the longue durée 
inquires into whole centuries at a time. (OH, 74) 
Both Braudel’s The Mediterranean and Civilization and Capitalism are divided into three 
volumes which roughly correspond to the above temporal stratifications. Analysis of the 
final stratum, the longue durée, is akin to structural history, the analysis of repetitive and 
unchanging elements that structure the agencies and forces that exist at the lower strata.3 
He writes: 
It functions along the border between the moving and the immobile, and 
because of the long-standing stability of its values, it appears unchanging 
compared with all the histories which flow and work themselves out 
more swiftly, and which in the final analysis gravitate around it. (OH, 74) 
                                                          
3 Christopher Lloyd’s The Structures of History (1993) advocates for socio-historical realism in the 
face of the relativism implied by strictly idiographic approaches. Immanuel Wallerstein’s three 
part Modern World System has aspirations to total history, and continues where Braudel’s 
Civilization and Capitalism ends.  
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There could be nothing further from the traditional chronicles of political events. Within 
this temporal stratum are the unchanging and stable structural continuities that underlie 
chronological analysis. Braudel’s The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age 
of Philip II begins with an analysis of these immobile structures: the features, resources 
and dispersion of mountains, hills, plains, seas, coasts and islands, climate, seasons and 
other natural cycles. Here, historical analysis is seen to be comfortable with a nomothetic 
approach; or, in Braudel’s words, these movements “govern the life of man” (MW, v.1, 
102).  
Braudel considered the idiographic element of history to lie in the shortest time 
span: that of events. While that may seem uncontroversial, it is not – there is a lack of 
consensus over what the basic unit of historical analysis is or ought to be. Braudel 
distinguished two kinds of events, the unique and non-repeatable, and the serial or 
repetitive event. The former, classically considered by outsiders to be the purview of 
history, was his target, though he did not deny the allure of unique events. He writes, 
“Like any historian, I am attracted to the unique event, which blooms for but a single 
day and then fades, never to be held between one’s fingers” (OH, 67). The allure of the 
event does not justify exclusive attention to it. Braudel instead envisions a history that is 
not confined to individual events: 
To transcend the event means transcending the short time span in which 
it is set, the time span of the chronicle, or of journalism—the brief 
moments of awareness whose traces give us such a vivid sense of the 
events and lives of the past. It means asking if over and above the passage 
of events, there is not an unconscious, or rather a more or less conscious, 
history which to a great extent escapes the awareness of the actors, 
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whether victors or victims: they make history, but history bears them 
along. (OH, 67) 
It seems important to note that while his vision incorporates both long term and short 
term analysis into a single history, Braudel claims that while the scale of history 
increases, the awareness of historical agents ceases to be of use for the historian. This is a 
point to which I will return in chapter 3. The merging of distinct time scales into a single 
model of explanation should also be a claim met with skepticism, as Braudel is often at 
pains to explain how distinct temporal strata interact. Important to our purposes, 
however, is the manner in which Braudel claims that both structural and event oriented 
explanation fall within the purview of history in a single research agenda. 
Historie des Mentalités 
Through the controversy of nomothetic/idiographic distinction in the context of 
the Methodenstreit, our analysis has primarily straddled the relationship between 
anthropology, history and sociology. However, an analysis of the Annales historians 
would be incomplete without reference to the relationship of history to another 
emergent social science, namely, psychology. With this shift in register, we enter the 
territory of the Annales, which is most resistant to the use of laws and structures in 
historical explanation. As I aim to prove in this section, the historical objects studied 
within the historie des mentalités cannot be explained with recourse to nomothetic 
principles. I argue that there are two types of inquiry into collective psychology: the 
synchronic and the serial.  
Works within the histoire des mentalités seek to understand a past moment as a 
microcosm, preserving the interior space of a collective. In doing so, Annales historians 
have produced portraits of past peoples with their alterity intact. With that said, among 
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the Annales there is no clear consensus about what mentalités, in general, consists. 
Jacques Le Goff is quick to concede the ambiguity of the term, and there exists 
Anglophone literature, such as Llyod’s Demystifying Mentalités, which probes whether or 
not mentalités are explanatorily useful in historical accounts. Le Goff writes, “the primary 
attraction of the histoire des mentalités lies in its vagueness: it can be used to refer to the 
left-overs, the indefinable residue of historical analysis” (‘Constructing the Past,’ p. 166).  
Perhaps the ambiguities are necessary, for the histoire des mentalités promised to study 
aspects of the historical past which were left out of traditional historiography. In some 
sense, the idea seems akin to Cornelius Castoriadis’ ‘social imaginaries’ – and in my 
estimation seems an important corollary to intellectual history.  Le Goff writes:  
The histoire des mentalités operates at the level of the everyday 
automatisms of behavior. Its object is that which escapes historical 
individuals because it reveals the impersonal content of their thought: 
that which is common to Caesar and his most junior legionary, Saint 
Louis and the peasant on his lands, Christopher Columbus and any one 
of his sailors. The histoire des mentalités is to the history of ideas as the 
history of material culture is to economic history. (‘Constructing the Past,’ 
169) 
Given our framework, the histoire des mentalités is the idiographic aspect of a nomothetic 
corollary: intellectual history or the history of ideas—that which escapes the nomos of 
development, refinement and progress of ideas.  
Using psychology, however, is not always the best means for historical 
explanation. The use of psychology in history often commits the historiographic sin of 
anachronism. It should be noted that the gesture of historical depth, or the admission 
into the interior of historical spaces is a common trope, but a trope that is difficult to 
convincingly fake. The necessary distinction is between emic and etic categories, those 
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‘native’ to past cultures, rather than ‘imposed’ on them by the historian (FP, 109). We 
have, on the one hand, an entire tradition of western thought that attempted to uncover 
the inner workings of historical forces, whether that meant the corso and ricorso of 
dominant civilizations, the Produktionsweise which conditioned social and political life, 
or the drives of the Unbewusste. While these general categories can be applied as an 
analytic, the explanation they provide is at the expense of the voices of historical 
subjects. Each of these theorists, in their own way, posit a lack of transparency to these 
historical laws, such that individual and collective alike facilitate their action while 
unaware of their presence. In their daily lives, people have and continue to maintain 
structures of power and privilege, acting in accordance with ‘laws’ that determine 
behavior. In such a schema, the masses are victims of a dominant class that cynically 
manipulates them by means of ‘false consciousness.’ The opacity of these laws to social 
actors is taken as warrant to exclude the voices of the past in favor of the narrative of the 
historian (a point which I will return to in chapter 3). The histoire des mentalités, instead, 
is assured that individuals understood the limitations and possibilities imposed by 
structures, whether institutional or mental, and so instead attempts to present the past in 
its alterity. 
From the perspective of the present moment, the reconstruction of the past poses 
a set of epistemological issues. How we interpret the space between the past and the 
present, as a bridge, or a gulf, will radically color our views of historical epistemology. 
In his 1984 Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University, Paul Ricœur argues that the reality 
of the historical past, as a problem, can be approached either by the similarity of the past 
to the present or through the difference between the past and the present. In Ricœur’s 
terms, history can be written under the sign of either the Same or the Other. Under the 
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Same he places the “re-enactment” of the past, following Collingwood and historians 
who study the past in its likeness to the present (RHP, 5). Under the Other, he discusses 
the sense of the past’s remoteness from the present, the effect of strangeness that a 
historical account can produce. If we view historiography through this binary, we can 
accord space to another, more controversial theoretical expression of a historical 
research agenda, namely, the histoire des mentalités.  
It should be noted that the histoire des mentalités is not reducible to the agendas of 
intellectual history. Roger Chartier points out that the histoire des mentalités “is that of 
daily life and habits; it is what escapes the individual subjects of history because it 
reveals the impersonal content of their thoughts” (IHSH, 22, emphasis mine). Lucien Febvre 
wrote compellingly of the European obsession with Witchcraft, and, in doing so, 
presented a vision of medieval Europe awash with complexities. History often overlooks 
“revolutions of the intellect which occur noiselessly and which no historian takes the 
trouble to record” (Febvre, 1973, p. 191). Similar to Bloch’s approach to agrarian history, 
Febvre notes that this area of research suffers from proper documentary evidence. What 
sort of witness would even be capable of taking the distance necessary in order to 
present their contemporaries as a microcosm? The histoire des mentalités then faces a 
problem similar to psychology, insofar as it requires the implicit to become explicit. The 
use of indirect evidence in such circumstances is both warranted and necessary, as 
contemporaries are unlikely to take notice of the impersonal content of their thought. 
Chartier writes, “unlike economic or social historians, who reconstitute what was, the 
historian of mentalités or ideas seeks not the real but the ways in which people 
considered and transposed reality” (CH, 43). Rather than find such information in the 
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works of metaphysicians, which often contain individual elements of thought, the 
historian of mentalités seeks this information in the collective, and in the material trace.  
This does not mean, however, that the works of great thinkers are taboo for these 
historians. For example, Febvre points out that Jean Bodin, known today for his social, 
political and historical writings, was also the author of Traité de la démonomanie des 
sorciers, “one of the most depressing works of the age… which had countless editions” 
(Febvre, 1973, 189). From this we can gather that belief in witchcraft was not, as we 
might think, mere superstition, as the brightest minds of the Europe were also 
convinced of the existence of witches. Moreover, the example illustrates one method for 
restoring the alterity to the past - defamiliarizing the familiar.  
In The Royal Touch, Bloch traces the belief in the king’s ability to heal Scrofula, a 
disease which no longer exists. In the course of his work, he discovers that individuals 
had no illusions about the ability of the king to heal the disease, yet still for hundreds of 
years thousands made pilgrimages in order to see the king and be touched by him. If 
Bloch proposed the royal touch as an example of ideology, he would still be at pains to 
explain why the tradition lasted so long. Instead, Bloch attempts to demonstrate that 
people believed that the king did not have this power, and yet went to visit anyway. 
This example of a study of mentality is infamous in that it demonstrates simultaneous 
belief and incredulity, a combination that would appear to us as logically inconsistent, 
yet nonetheless Bloch presents it without intervening or attempting to ‘correct’ the 
collective sentiments of medieval Europeans.   
Given the influence of Braudel on the research agendas of the Annales, many 
chose to forgo historical accounts which focused exclusively on single events. Burke 
writes, “radical social historians rejected narrative because they associated it with an 
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over-emphasis on the great deeds of great men, with the importance of individuals in 
history and especially the importance of political and military leaders being 
overestimated at the expense of ordinary men – and women” (CH, 122). Indeed, we 
could associate such historical methodologies with scholars like Sidney Hook, in his The 
Hero in History. The rejection of narrative is a component of the ‘history of below’ – 
histories which focus on the subaltern and the marginalized, or at least histories which 
are cognizant of the complex interplay of historical structures and human agency.  
Now that we have analyzed the justification and analytical object of the histoire 
des mentalités, we will turn to methods for writing. In what remains of this section on 
mentalités, I will analyze two methods: one serial and one synchronic. Histories which 
fall under the serial method focus on repetitive occurrences and have a non-
chronological, yet diachronic method of organization. The synchronic often focuses on a 
single, aleatory transformation, controversies and discontinuities. Phillippe Ariès uses 
serial methods to construct mentalités in his Western Attitudes Towards Death. He studies 
cultural phenomena which seem to be governed by inertia rather than change. His 
corresponding methodology must account for changes in what appears to be “a-
chronic,” writing that “at certain moments, changes occur, usually slow and unnoticed 
change, but sometimes, as today, more rapid and perceptible ones” (Ariès 1).   
Ariès uses indirect evidence, literary evidence, documentary evidence and 
material evidence; citations of Solzhenitsyn intermingle with John Chrysostom. A 
striking example of Ariès’ use of indirect, material evidence is his analysis of the living 
to the dead. People were once ambivalent towards where they would be buried and 
where the dead were kept, as attested to by funeral archeology. Christianity is credited 
with the development of concern over where remains were kept, first in the form of the 
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desire to be buried close to martyrs and saints. Churches held remains, and so 
overturned an ancient practice of burial extra urbem (Ariès 16). These developments 
attest to the fact that individuals had less scruples about proximity to the dead in ancient 
times. Ariès writes, “the fact that the dead had entered the church and its courtyard did 
not prevent both from becoming public places” (Ariès 23). In these times, death was 
collectivized, not faced individually, and cemeteries were public spaces where 
businesses, sportsmen and entertainers operated, played and performed. Urban 
cemeteries were a regular feature of European cities until the early modern period, “at 
the end of the seventeenth century signs of intolerance began to appear, the fact remains 
that for more than a thousand years people had been perfectly adapted to this 
promiscuity between the living and the dead” (Ariès 25).  
The transformation of death from a collective rite to an individual trial shifted 
the entire register of what death, as a concept, meant to people. Developments such as 
literary and artistic depictions of the bedchambers of the dying (Ariès, 33), the fear of 
decomposition (Ariès 39), and individualization of burial plots and tombs (Ariès 46), 
reflected a change in religious sensibility about the importance of individual 
responsibility in the face of the last judgement (Ariès 31). Then, there is the development 
of “eroticomacabre themes” between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, where 
death was “increasingly thought of as a transgression” rife with irrational, violent and 
sublime connotations. Concurrent with the eroticomacabre, is a transformation in the 
sensibility of death 
In the past death in bed was a solemn event, but also an event as banal as 
seasonal holidays. People expected it, and when it occurred they follow 
the rituals laid down by custom. But in the nineteenth century, a new 
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passion stirred those present. Emotion shook them, they cried, prayed, 
gesticulated… henceforth these activities were described as if they had 
been invented for the first time, spontaneously, inspired by a passionate 
sorrow which is unique among sorrows. (Ariès 59) 
In the 17th century, people developed an intolerance for the collective presence of the 
dead in cities, in the 18th century, people developed an intolerance for the separation 
implied by death, the permanent break of familial and kinship bonds. 
My interest here is not to reproduce Ariès’ study, but rather the way in which it 
demonstrates a radical shift in the sense of a concept. While the content of death has 
changed little, if at all, the mentality surrounding death has radically changed, to what 
Ariès calls forbidden death, the denial of death, or the attempt to hide it from others, 
especially children. Death is no longer a collective rite, but is rather “a technical 
phenomenon… a decision of the doctor and the hospital team” (Ariès, 88). The technical 
event is also free from ritual practices like mourning periods. If it were not for funeral 
and wake services, there would be little connection with death as experienced in the 
previous millennia.  
Reflecting on Ariès’ study, it seems important to note that there is little 
continuity between the stages, and certainly no overarching rationale which could 
account for why the changes occur in the way that they did. We are left with the 
impression of the contingency of each development: religious sensibilities encouraged 
collective burial sites, urban cemeteries encouraged a new intolerance for death, the 
alliance of “eroticism in order to express the break with the established order,” and 
finally, the shame and secrecy of death in contemporary treatment (Ariès, 105). Ariès’ 
study is one of the few among the Annales which attempts to incorporate historical 
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information from the recent present. The scale of Ariès’ study, which examines change 
over the long term enables him to fit recent developments into his work. 
What of works on mentalités that are organized synchronically rather than 
diachronically? The paradigmatic example is Le Goff’s essay Merchant’s Time and 
Church’s Time in the Middle Ages. Within the essay, Le Goff uses both material and textual 
evidence in order to develop historical facts on the controversy between two senses of 
time in the Middle Ages. The present moment of writing serves as the final aspect of Le 
Goff’s comparison, in that the idea of time as connected to space and as a functional 
measure of human activity is still known to us today, whose development was 
materialized in the development of communal clocks for cities governed by trade (TWC, 
35). However, the archaic eschatological sense of time, which connects the minutiae of 
daily life to the eternity of God’s kingdom, is alien to our sense. Le Goff’s conceit is that 
these senses of time are not mutually exclusive, but were transformed by both 
intellectual/moral controversies and material practices.    
Within this schema, each sense of time corresponded to an ethics, and from this 
basis one can claim that merchant and church time were at odds. Primarily, this 
controversy concerned the practice of usury, and so concerned the basis of all economic 
activity in the form of profit over time or credit. Le Goff’s essay does not contain an 
exaggerated sense of importance of intellectual developments. He does note, however, 
the importance of Hellenistic philosophy in revitalizing a sense of the contingency of 
time in scholasticism (TWC, 40). This does not mean that Christians ceased to believe in 
God’s dominion over time – however, it does indicate that the sense of this idea 
transformed from the traditional conception that time is God’s and cannot be sold.  In 
order to chart this conjuncture, Le Goff relies on a wide range of indirect evidence from 
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industrial and commercial documents to works of theologians in order to develop his 
historical facts. 
What is Le Goff’s object of analysis? He argues that his analysis does not concern 
“an abstract collective individual,” but rather “men in the West between the twelfth and 
fifteenth centuries who were in possession of sufficient cultural and mental equipment 
to reflect on professional problems and their social, moral and religious consequences” 
(TWC, 29). The gulf between Durkheim’s collective representations and Le Goff’s 
concern is apparent. However, some proximity to ethnography is suggested due to the 
lack of first or second person testimony. The voice of the historian is predominant, and 
the essay takes the form of exploring the equipment without the interruption of those 
who utilized it. 
It is clear that the essay documents a change in the predominant collective 
understanding of time. The essay does not, however, proceed through causal 
explanation characteristic of accounts of historical change. Le Goff indicates that his 
intent is to “stimulate a more intensive study of a history which raises numerous 
problems”; this aim is evidently expressed by the lack of an indicated ultimate cause for 
the transformation (TWC, 41). Why did the Church capitulate? Roughly periodized and 
disconnected intellectual and economic trends are catalogued, but there are no pivotal 
events to speak of. The virtue of the essay is the presentation of realms of possibility 
within either mentality. Where a functional use of time allowed the merchant to engage 
in compartmentalization, the earlier views of the church were inflexible and would 
eventually yield to myriad developments.  
If each work of history contains an implicit philosophy of history, what can be 
said of Le Goff’s work, or of the histoire des mentalités in general? Here, the dynamics of 
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historical explanation are of unique importance. The essay keenly demonstrates the 
transformation between church and merchant time as the product of both human agency 
and intellectual reflection on practice. The capitulation of the church is not presented in 
irreversible terms: the overall change is described as a shifted “equilibrium” (TWC, 40). 
There are two merits to this form of non-narrative explanation: first, there is no implicit 
teleology – the claim that merchants both understood and lived time both piously and 
functionally eliminates a secularizing narrative. Second, historical structures are shown 
to be responsive to large-scale changes in industry and human agency. The manner in 
which homo faber is shown to be the result of reflection on changes in practice attests to 
the use of the essay as a supplement to intellectual history. Presented in this manner, 
intellectuals are not mistakenly shown to be the primary agents of historical 
transformation, as is often the case in the history of philosophy or intellectual history in 
general, but rather practical and intellectual developments are shown to work in concert.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have analyzed several research agendas of the Annales 
historians, developing a sense for the myriad trajectories which give the school its 
infamy. I have suggested that these trajectories should not be read at face value, but as 
attempts to expand the practice of history beyond sequesters resultant from changes in 
the 20th century French academy. These trajectories included both large scale, macro 
historical accounts and small scale micro historical accounts, as well as the pursuit of 
new historical inquires such as agrarian history or the histoire des mentalités, and problem 
based historical inquiry. These works required methodological innovations. These 
innovations divorced historiography from artificial organization imposed by either 
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archives or chronology and developed techniques for analyzing indirect and material 
evidence.  
In the subsequent chapters, I analyze two responses to the Annales trajectories. 
First, I analyze Foucault’s historical-programmatic writings, in the Order of Discourse and 
the Archeology of Knowledge. Next, I analyze some works of Rancière, especially the 
Names of History and the analysis of a poetics of knowledge. I propose the following 
stark difference in the reception of historiographic theory in French theory: the first 
generally accepts programmatic statements, whereas the latter seeks to undercut or 
undermine them in favor of an approach with more fidelity to the source material than 
programmatic concerns. 
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Chapter 2: Michel Foucault’s Archeological Historiography  
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In the second and third chapter, we shift the orbit of our discussion toward what 
is known as “French theory,” the “polyphonic, coolly critical, obscure, seductive and 
crafty” works of European intellectuals that, as a feature of the American academy, have 
become an alternative canon in their own right (Cusset, 277).  
As we have seen, in the previous chapter, the Annales historians defended their 
work from an impoverished documentary positivism. These apologetics in turn 
influenced the auto critical writing in the work of several French theorists. Within 
Foucault’s work, methodological reflection is used as an occasion to offer “retrospective 
coherence” to his earlier texts (OEC, 58). However, we are concerned here with how 
Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge purports to demonstrate the shared concerns 
between the Annales historians and philosophers of the history of science and literature. 
In doing so, Foucault attempts to combine the speculative reflection characteristic of 
philosophy and the documentary analysis of archival researchers. In The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, the meta-language characteristic of disciplinary apologetics is mobilized for 
auto-critical purposes. However, many scholars consider The Archaeology of Knowledge to 
be a methodological dead end.4  How far from the historical concerns of the Annales are 
Foucault’s theoretical contributions to historiography?  
The introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge begins with a consideration of 
recent advances in historical analyses of literature and science as well as the Annales 
historians. In his analysis, Foucault differentiates between “traditional histories,” which 
he associates with motifs of total history – chronologically organized series of political 
                                                          
4 See Dreyfus, Hubert L., Paul Rabinow, and Michel Foucault. "The Methodological Failure of 
Archaeology." Michel Foucault, beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: U of Chicago, 
1983, 79-103. 
Guzzi 38 
 
 
and social events that attempt to exhaust their object (AK, 3). He distinguishes these 
motifs with emergent characteristics of both Annales historians and philosophers who 
study the history of literature and science, such as Bachelard, Canguilhem and 
Althusser. Foucault “maintained that the opposition between historians concerned with 
stable structures and historians of literature and science, who emphasize the 
discontinuous, was but a ‘surface effect’ of a more fundamental accord” (Bernauer, 101). 
Reporting on this accord, however, does not mean that Foucault shares an outlook with 
all Annales historians. More substantive analysis is required to establish Foucault’s 
relation to these parties.  
David Carroll, in “The Times of History and the Orders of Discourse” from The 
Subject in Question, presents the views of Foucault and the Annales school as aligned. He 
claims that both Braudel and Foucault are interested in “complicat[ing] the form of 
temporality usually projected onto history” (Carroll, 123).  As a result, “the Order and 
the Time which History was thought to provide are thus replaced by the orders and 
times of various and conflicting histories and discursive practices” (Carroll, 123). 
Carroll’s analysis merges the vocabulary of Foucault and the Annales, presenting both as 
a challenge to a hegemonic total History.  Yet, it should be noted that a more complex 
analysis is possible, which would account for the differences between Annalistes, their 
research agendas and methodologies.  
Carroll’s analysis of the Archaeology of Knowledge accepts the antagonism between 
traditional history and the ‘new history’ as reason enough to claim that Foucault and 
Braudel are in accord. Here, we should analyze Foucault’s claim of an accord between 
historians of science and literature and the Annales, and in our reception, move beyond 
this shared antagonism to traditional history. In this chapter, we will analyze the 
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methodological criteria found in the Archaeology of Knowledge, the discrepancy between 
Foucault and the Annalistes over the concepts of series and event, and develop an 
account of how Foucault’s method contributes to the historiographical problem of 
teleology. First, we must develop a sense for Foucault’s concepts which are developed in 
The Archaeology of Knowledge.  
 The Archaeology of Knowledge is a multi-tiered methodological work. In it, 
Foucault advances his own criteria and abandons episteme as an organizing 
methodological concept. Instead, Foucault introduces an alternative method, that of 
Archaeology, which he claims “is the analysis of discourse in its archival form” (AME, 
289). Not a reconstructive method, as this archive is defined as “the accumulated 
existence of discourses,” and is, therefore, a presentist treatment of historical materials 
(AME, 289). By calling the approach a presentism, I mean to signal the anachronism 
built into the method. Here, I follow Hartog’s definition: presentism is “the sense that 
only the present exists, a present characterized at once by the tyranny of the instant and 
by the treadmill of the unending now” (Hartog, xv). As Michael Roth writes, Foucault’s 
“History of the Present” is an “antihistory attempting to make the present into a past 
which we leave rather than into a history which we tightly embrace as our own” (Roth, 
44). However, this does not mean that the historian uses the present as a means for 
representing the past. Foucault criticizes Michelet for using this sort of reconstructive 
technique.5 In order to produce this effect, the archaeological method takes a distance 
from familiar categories of historical analysis. 
                                                          
5 In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault writes: “By means of an illusion widespread in the nineteenth 
century, and one to which Michelet gave the dimensions of a myth, history painted the end of the 
Ancien Régime in the colours of the last years of the Middle Ages, confusing the upheavals of the 
Renaissance with the struggles of the Enlightenment” (BC, 125). 
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The problems presented by historicity, in the hermeneutic sense, are not of 
concern here, as Foucault analyses the ‘enunciative function’ of ‘statements’ and their 
‘positionality,’ all without reference to a speaker. The problems inherent in historical 
criticism, observation, and judgment are sidestepped for a neutralizing descriptivism. 
As Ricœur states, “Foucault has delimited a radially neutral terrain, or rather a costly 
neutralized one, that of statements without a speaker” (MHF, 202). The philosophically 
informed archivist of Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, inspired by the shortcomings 
or subjectivism in intellectual history, settles for a new method of rigorous, 
programmatic description.  
The section Archaeology and the History of Ideas, contains a term for term 
opposition between traditional history and Foucault’s Archaeological method. Here, the 
notions of archive, positivity and discursive formation are placed within the domain of 
statements, enunciative field, and discursive practices, generally (AK, 135). Foucault’s 
concept of archive takes into account material evidence, as well as documentary 
evidence, so much so that he claims that all documents are considered “monuments” in 
the historical practices of the Annales (AK, 7). Where Bloch defined the object of history 
as men, Foucault claims that the archaeology of the human sciences shows “man is an 
invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end” (HC, 27 ; OT, 387). It could 
be argued that Bloch’s regressive method, found especially in French Rural History, is a 
kind of archeological analysis. Like Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, French Rural 
History proceeds backwards from available evidence, the former constructing a method, 
the latter reconstructing the remote past.  
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The main differences between the two approaches follow from the differences in 
scale. In his methodological prelude, Bloch informs us of the danger of granular 
analysis:  
Factual data capable of definitive interpretation are to be expected only 
from a field of research prudently tailored to a topographical setting. But 
this scale is too small to allow the major questions to be posed. For that 
we need wider perspectives, where there is no danger of losing sight of 
the main promontories among a confused mass of accidental detail. (FRH, 
xxiv) 
This appeal to wider perspectives entails a search for the continuities general enough to 
be relevant across the centuries. Foucault’s work, however, is well known for contributing 
to a micro-physics of power, which he states is “diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous, 
systematic discourse; it is often made up of bits and pieces; it implements a disparate set 
of tools or methods (DP, 26). Foucault’s distance from the human subject allows for this 
transformation of scale, from the longue durée to the microphysics of power. This 
transformation of scale, however, did not develop in a vacuum, and, as we will see, entails 
a calculated break from Annales historiography. 
Period, Series and Event 
By now, we see that there is a complex relation between Annales historiography 
and Foucault’s archaeology, for several reasons. First, as evinced in the first chapter, 
Annales historiography is not ‘of a piece’ – there are discrepancies between individual 
historians, there are multiple incompatible methods, many research agendas. Foucault’s 
archaeology is very distant from the anthropological and humanistic commitments of 
some Annalistes, finding proximity instead to the serial methods developed by Braudel, 
and the Chaunus. Of this serial method, Foucault has much to say. Our concern in this 
Guzzi 42 
 
 
chapter are two elements of Foucault’s archaeological method: the first, in his 
assessment of serial history, the concepts of series and event, second, the analytic 
separation between discourse and practice, specifically the implications this separation 
has for historiography, teleology and human agency.  
Much of Foucault’s explicit commentary on contemporary historiography 
concerned the relationship of events to series.6 As seen in the first chapter of this thesis, 
Braudel developed a theory of temporal stratification in an attempt to move 
historiography beyond listing political and social events in chronological succession. 
Foucault takes issue with Braudel’s approach, which can be read as restricting events to 
a single temporal plane, defined by their short duration. Foucault, in aligning his 
method of discontinuity with serial history, argues for a constructivist approach to the 
development of historical facts. 
 Foucault establishes his view of the relationship between event and series 
succinctly in the interview “On the Ways of Writing History” (1967): 
Every periodization carves out in history a certain level of events, and 
conversely, each layer of events calls for its own periodization. This is a 
set of delicate problems, since, depending on the level that one selects, 
one will have to delimit different periodizations, and, depending on the 
periodization one provides, one will reach different levels. In this way 
one arrives at the complex methodology of discontinuity. (AME, 281) 
In elaborating the methodology of discontinuity, Foucault echoes Braudel’s theory of 
temporal stratification. Foucault argues that traditional histories are focused on 
documentary criticism, and attempt to fit documents into an already existing structure – 
                                                          
6 I am indebted to the discussion of Foucault and the Annales found in Dean, Mitchell. Critical and 
Effective Histories: Foucault's Methods and Historical Sociology. London: Routledge, 1994, (p. 38) for 
making the importance of this commentary apparent. 
Guzzi 43 
 
 
the chronology of events and the succession of political organizations. With the new 
history, traditional documentary analysis is replaced, and instead historians 
Ha[ve] taken as [their] primary task, not the interpretation of the 
document, nor the attempt to decide whether it is telling the truth or 
what is its expressive value, but to work on it from within and to develop 
it: history now organizes the document, divides it up, distributes it, 
orders it, arranges it in levels, establishes series, distinguishes between 
what is relevant and what is not, discovers elements, defines unites, 
describes relations. (AK, 6) 
All this to say that historians use documents in a different way. Historians do not find 
facts, they create them by organizing more basic elements. In terms of facts, the logic of 
discovery is superseded by the logic of constructivism. Here, events and series are 
described in a relationship of dependence, each contingent on the other. So far, Foucault 
does seem to be in an accord with the Annales, in regards to the construction of historical 
facts, distinct layers of temporality, and by attesting to the intervention of the historian 
into her material. As Martin Kusch claims in Foucault’s Strata and Fields, both Foucault 
and the Annales share the conviction that traditional historical accounts “took for 
granted the existence of certain ‘natural’ series,” the greatest of which is chronology 
(Kusch, 42). 
This accord, however, is undermined by Foucault’s account of series and events. 
The relationship of event and series is an important occasion in Foucault’s reflection on 
historical methodology in that it provides an explicit repudiation of Braudel’s 
understanding of events in his theory of temporal stratification. While both thinkers, 
then, oppose their own method to ‘traditional history,’ we see that behind this shared 
antagonism lies a discrepancy. Foucault’s understanding of event and series does not 
Guzzi 44 
 
 
rely on chronology as an external measure, as Braudel’s theory of temporal stratification 
does. Where Braudel argues that events take place only at the third level of temporal 
stratification, Foucault argues that events take place at multiple strata. This relation 
between event and series is treated at length in The Discourse on Language, where 
Foucault’s distance from Braudel becomes clear.  
 In The Discourse on Language, Foucault states: 
We frequently credit contemporary history with having removed the 
individual event from its privileged position and with having revealed 
the more enduring structures of history. That is so. I am not sure, 
however, that historians have been working in this direction alone. Or, 
rather, I do not think one can oppose the identification of the individual 
event to the analysis of long term trends quite so neatly. On the contrary, 
it seems to me that it is in squeezing the individual event, in directing the 
resolving power of historical analysis onto official price-lists (mercuriales), 
title deeds, parish registers, to harbor archives analyzed year by year and 
week by week, that we gradually perceive — beyond battles, decisions, 
dynasties and assemblies — the emergence of those massive phenomena 
of secular or multi-secular importance. History, as it is practiced today, 
does not turn its back on events; on the contrary, it is continually 
enlarging the field of events, constantly discovering new layers — more 
superficial as well as more profound — incessantly isolating new 
ensembles — events, numerous, dense and interchangeable or rare and 
decisive: from daily price fluctuations to secular inflations. (AK, 230) 
Where Braudel argued against histories comprised of events, specifically political events 
such as wars, revolutions or transfers of power, Foucault presents an expanded sense of 
events in order to demonstrate the manner in which Annales historians have 
reinvigorated the primacy of events in historiography. While Braudel held trends and 
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events in analytic tension, Foucault argues that the attention to trends instead offers 
relief to events which would otherwise not be discernable. He continues:  
 What is significant is that history does not consider an event without 
defining the series to which it belongs, without specifying the method of 
analysis used, without seeking out the regularity of phenomena and the 
probable limits of their occurrence, without inquiring about variations, 
inflexions and the slope of the curve, without desiring to know the 
conditions on which these depend. History has long since abandoned its 
attempts to understand events in terms of cause and effect in the formless 
unity of some great evolutionary process, whether vaguely homogeneous 
or rigidly hierarchized. It did not do this in order to seek out structures 
anterior to, alien or hostile to the event. It was rather in order to establish 
those diverse converging, and sometimes divergent, but never 
autonomous series that enable us to circumscribe the ‘locus’ of an event, 
the limits to its fluidity and the conditions of its emergence. (AK, 230)  
Where series once emerged in chronology as a secondary effect, series are now the 
primary construction of historians. The construction of new series provides a “locus” for 
events, a relief which provides sense to events as referents. Indeed, the construction of 
series is described as a primary task of historians in The Archaeology of Knowledge. 
Foucault claims that the historian’s task is “to define the elements proper to each series, 
to fix its boundaries, to reveal its own specific type of relations, to formulate its laws, 
and, beyond this, to describe the relations between different series, thus constituting 
series of series, or ‘tables’…” (AK, 8). As the result of a historian’s judgment, a range of 
facts are given an artificial limit. The relations that exist between series also create a new 
problem for ‘total’ histories, as series may not converge or culminate.  The level of 
generalizability necessary for a total history cannot be made with the elements of a serial 
history, as, at some point, series are not relative to each other, given that they are 
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comprised of heterogeneous elements. For example, demographic trends do not directly 
correlate to economic trends, as each trend is comprised of distinct units. Nor are series 
in the history of climate, such as rainfall averages, relative to events in the history of 
prison and ransom.  Such series could all be part of the same history, if it were organized 
geographically, however.  
Foucault argues that both events and the series to which they belong are 
produced by historians, that neither are given. Implicitly, he seems to suggest that 
Braudel and similar thinkers maintain the ‘event’ as a natural unit defined by a short 
duration, confined to a single temporal strata. There is much in Braudel’s writing which 
suggests as much. In The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II, 
Braudel claims that “events are the ephemera of history; they pass across its stage like 
fire-flies, hardly glimpsed before they settle back into dark and as often as not into 
oblivion” (MW, 901). 
 In Foucault’s estimation, events do not pre-exist historical writing in some grand 
chronological movement of time, nor do they comprise a natural unit.7 Foucault clearly 
attests to these implications in an interview, where he states that “serial history does not 
focus on general objects that have been constituted beforehand, such as feudalism or 
industrial development; serial history defines its object on the basis of an ensemble of 
documents at its disposal” (AME, 426-7). Braudel, in a similar vein, argues that there is 
creative space allotted by documentary evidence, but places this on par with the 
historian’s intervention or judgment: “one could say that any event which forms a link 
in a chain can be considered significant. But even ‘serial’ history is the result of a 
                                                          
7 Here Foucault’s proximity to Reinhardt Koselleck’s view in “Representation, Structure, Event” 
is worth noting.  
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selection, made either by the historian or for him by available documentary evidence” 
(MW, 902). It would be misleading to suggest that Braudel totally breaks with the idea 
that events have some value prior to their inclusion in a series, whether this value is in 
terms of importance, consequence, or duration. In other words, where Foucault is 
comfortable detaching history from chronology, Braudel does not abandon chronology 
as a means of organizing events.  
Causality, Agency and Determinism in Historical Explanation 
In The Discourse on Language, Foucault states: 
What is significant is that history does not consider an event without 
defining the series to which it belongs, without specifying the method of 
analysis used, without seeking out the regularity of phenomena and the 
probable limits of their occurrence, without inquiring about variations, 
inflexions and the slope of the curve, without desiring to know the conditions 
on which these depend. (AK (my emphasis), 230) 
Foucault’s claims here have complex etiological implications worth exploring. Without 
chronology or causality, how could transitions be explained?  Foucault argues that there 
are logical alternatives to cause and effect: 
As soon as relations of a logical type, like implication, exclusion, 
transformation are introduced in historical analysis, it is obvious that 
causality disappears. But we have to rid ourselves of the prejudice that 
history without causality would no longer be history. (RC, 92)  
Foucault appeals to logical criteria, to be preferred over causality by historians. Relations 
established by the historian occur between documents, or, in other words, is a product 
made at the moment of writing. Foucault states, “using this method, the historian can 
reveal events that would not have appeared in any other way” (AME, 427). Within 
traditional history, the significant events were given, not discovered. The historian’s task 
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required that causes were ascribed to these events in order to elucidate, among other 
things, their meaning. Foucault takes issue with chronology, in that it naturalizes 
synchronicity, making it needless to explain synchronic events. He claims “we consider 
the understanding of the way one event succeeds another as a specifically historical 
issue, and yet we do not consider as an historical issue one which is in fact equally so: 
understanding how two events can be contemporaneous” (RC, 92). Here, however, it is 
not the cause which is hidden and the event which is visible. Rather, it is events which 
are hidden. In another interview, Foucault claims: 
Serial history makes it possible to bring out different layers of events as it 
were, some being visible, even immediately knowable by the 
contemporaries, and then, beneath these events that form the froth of 
history, so to speak, there are other events that are invisible, 
imperceptible for the contemporaries, and are of completely different 
form. (AME, 427-8) 
Foucault introduces an important caveat: an indifference to whether or not individuals 
understood the significance of these events as they occurred. We can conclude then, that 
Foucault’s account does not pivot on whether or not a historian uniquely attests to the 
importance of a historical event. This is part and parcel of our next topic, Foucault’s 
indifference to the classical categories of subjectivity: experience, agency and intention.  
Foucault’s analysis also offers insight into his rejection of subjective 
considerations, like experience. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault states that 
archaeology “does not try to restore what has been thought, wished, aimed at, 
experienced, desired by men in the very moment at which they expressed it in 
discourse” (AK, 139). In this double disavowal, Foucault distances the archeological 
method from historical reconstruction in general, and the histoire des mentalités 
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specifically. Given our analysis in the previous chapter, we discerned that a theme of the 
histoire des mentalités was to reconstruct the limiting concepts of thought within a certain 
epoch. This attention to the limiting structures which condition the possibilities of 
human action within a certain time span seems very similar to Foucault’s concept of 
episteme. Archaeology takes a distance from both episteme and mentalités, in Foucault’s 
rejection of both reconstruction (and attendant issues like chronology, anachronism, 
cause and effect) and subjectivity. Foucault claims that archaeology “is nothing more 
than a rewriting: that is, in the preserved form of exteriority, a regulated transformation 
of what has already been written. It is not a return to the innermost secret of the origin; it 
is the systematic description of a discourse-object” (AK, 140).  
While Foucault’s assessment of series and event explains his distance from 
chronological and etiological concerns, why the disdain for the categories of 
subjectivity? Why would mentalités not factor into “the systematic description of a 
discourse-object”? 
In his commentary in I, Pierre Rivière: A Case of Parricide in the 19th Century, 
Foucault analyzes two events by first troubling their sequence. In the section “Text and 
Murder” he writes, “In Rivière’s behavior memoir and murder were not ranged simply 
in chronological sequence – crime and then narrative. The text does not relate directly to 
the deed; a whole web of relations is woven between the one and the other; they support 
one another and carry one another in ever-changing relations” (IP, 201). While 
Foucault’s commentary is not specifically deemed an ‘archaeological account,’ there 
seem to be enough relevant similarities in Foucault’s treatment of the lettres de cachet 
found in the Annales d’hygiène publique et de medicine légale  (Rocha, 193). Foucault 
indicates the discontinuities between Rivière’s confession and his act – and, in doing so 
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assigns to them distinct agencies in the present moment. As Rivière had spent time and 
care deliberating on the murder, so much so that he considered his confession prior to 
the act, the text was “drafted in his head beforehand” (IP, 202). It is due to this curious 
displacement of the confession prior to the act that the text is considered by Foucault to 
be a factor in the murder, an equivalence between “weapon” and “discourse” (IP, 203). 
Rather than merging the act and the confession into a whole, like a judge or a journalist 
interested in using reconstruction to establish motive or intent, the analytic separation of 
these two successive events is possible only if neither are fully subsumed into each 
other.  
The above case, in refusing a reconstruction of the intention of Rivière, instead 
describing the text and the act as two distinct and competing functions, demonstrates for 
us a complex interplay which does not reach closure in a cause and effect sequence. 
Here, experience is misleading in that it reduces two ‘strata’ into a single event. As 
Foucault argues, the narrative has a unique role in making “the transition from the 
familiar to the remarkable, the everyday to the historical” (IP, 204). The narrative is a 
crucial element in enlarging the event beyond the scope of the everyday and into 
historical importance. The relationship between the narrative and the event is one of a 
transformation of scale, not simply one of chronological succession. Further, Foucault 
adds that  
the ambiguous existence of these sheets undoubtedly masks the processes 
of a subterranean battle which continued in the aftermath of the 
Revolutionary struggles and the Empire’s wars around two rights, 
perhaps less heterogeneous than they seem at first sight – the right to kill 
and be killed and the right to speak and narrate. (IP, 207)  
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Foucault’s remarks place Rivière’s crime into an unusual, if not typically invisible, series, 
remarking on the proximity between “the ‘curious’ news items, the ‘extraordinary’ facts, 
and the great events and personages of history” (IP, 205).  
We have in the example of Pierre Rivière an instance where the subjective 
categories of experience, intention, and motive are rejected in order to hold the closure 
of several events at a distance. This is not the only place where Foucault argues that 
experience can be historiographically misleading. In an interview, Foucault offers an 
illuminating example: 
The fact that Europe’s demographic curve, which was pretty much 
stationary in the course of the eighteenth century, rose abruptly at the 
end of the eighteenth century and continued to rise in the nineteenth is, in 
part, what made possible the industrial development of Europe in the 
nineteenth century, but no one experience this event in the way that one 
might have lived through the revolutions of 1848. (AME, 428) 
Here, Foucault’s point hinges on the fact that experience may be misleading. Certainly 
contemporaries often misjudge or mistake the importance of events, or events fall 
beyond their perception in ways that archival research can recover. Also, Foucault’s 
archaeological method attempts to replace, term for term, problematic elements of the 
history of ideas, which often uses subjective categories, such as influence, in order to 
describe the transmission of information between subjects. Such language, from the 
standpoint of systematic description, attributes mental capacity to history itself.  
Let’s analyze the problem of anthropomorphic history. In the section Change and 
Transformations, Foucault criticizes two models of history which offers more insight into 
his rejection of the categories of subjectivity. He claims that history has been presented 
in “the model of the stream of consciousness whose presence always eludes itself in its 
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openness to the future and its retention of the past” (AK, 169). Two concerns are present 
here. First, there is the problem of presenting intellectual transmission as synchronic: 
one thinker ‘influences’ another – despite the fact that they were not contemporaries 
and, in the final analysis, thought in different ways. Next, there is the “retention of the 
past” found in etiological description, progressive succession, Aufhebung. Here, 
chronological order (or, in Foucault’s terms, “the thread of an original calendar”) implies 
the retention of the past, even in absence of some vector of material transmission or 
preservation (AK, 169). Ultimately, anthropomorphic characterizations of history found 
in the history of ideas either insert teleological agency into historical explanation, or 
cover over discontinuities. Foucault claims that  
Anyone envisaging the analysis of discourse solely in terms of temporal 
continuity would inevitably be led to approach and analyze it like the 
internal transformation of an individual consciousness. Which would 
lead to his erecting a great collective consciousness as the scene of events. 
(PK, 69) 
Foucault instead suggests that concepts like influence do not describe change, but are 
forgotten metaphors or substitutes for adequate explanations of change and 
transformation. He claims that “discourse… is not a consciousness that embodies its 
project in the external form of language; it is not a language, plus a subject to speak it. It 
is a practice that has its own forms of sequence and succession” (AK, 169). We will 
return to the point that discourse has unique forms of transformation, but first it is 
important to evaluate the account of agential change found in the Archeology.  
 Could Foucault, in his early writings, be accused of diminishing the force of 
agentic power? Insofar as the agentic possibilities require relay through the 
archeologist’s description, it does appear that this is the case. For example, Foucault 
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writes that “the description of the archive deploys its possibilities” granting a sort of 
revitalizing power to description (AK, 131). Further, this power is described as that of 
ruptures and breaks, it “deprives us of our continuities; it dissipates the temporal 
identity… it breaks the thread of transcendental teleologies… bursts open the other, and 
the outside” (AK, 131). In each case, the ‘deployment of possibilities’ seems to result in 
the same negative agency, an aleatory eruption resulting from the description of the 
archive. In this sense, the question of agency is evaded insofar as the locus of concern 
remains the archive’s meaning for the present, and not a reconstruction of past events. 
Put otherwise, Foucault’s ‘method of discontinuity’ seems to reduce the complex 
varieties of agential change to a single model of disruption.  
What use is the method of discontinuity for describing change if it abandons the 
logic of cause and effect? Foucault’s works typically do not contain the causal closure 
which is demanded from historical accounts. Changes appear, the magnitude of which is 
attested to, but seldom are reasons offered for these changes. We have seen that 
Foucault’s archaeological method lacks etiology in two respects: first, in terms of 
chronological succession, and second, in terms of subjectivity, experience, and human 
agency. While, as in the case of Pierre Rivière, this opens up the space for alternative 
explanations, it is not clear that the method of discontinuity is a preferable 
historiographical method. In fact, the rejection of these two forms of etiology only 
corresponds to problems that are found within the description of knowledge – a revised 
history of ideas. However, discontinuity in historical writing has important applications 
to the problem of teleology in historiography.  
  
Guzzi 54 
 
 
Teleology in Historiography 
The dependence of events on series promotes general, rather than total histories, 
eliminating the issue of teleological extra-historical forces, like providence, from 
historical accounts. Foucault’s introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge reports the 
movement away from theories which posit a single unity, like total histories, from those 
which accept a multiplicity of singularities, like general histories. Of total histories, 
Foucault writes that  
the project of a total history is one that seeks to reconstitute the overall 
form of a civilization, the principle – material or spiritual- of a society, the 
significance common to all the phenomena of a period, the law that 
accounts for their cohesion – what is called metaphorically the ‘face’ of a 
period. (AK, 9) 
Total history is contrasted with general history, of which Foucault writes: “The task of a 
general history is to determine what form of relation may be legitimately described 
between these different series; what vertical system they are capable of forming…” (AK, 10, 
my emphasis). Here, Foucault attributes possible form to the vertical relations of a general 
history, indicating that these general histories are largely destabilizing with regard to 
vertical hierarchies. I argue that this specific attribute is in response to Braudel’s theory 
of temporal stratification, which assigns a “clear hierarchy of explanation” not to each 
stratum, but all stratums as a whole (Appleby et al, 308).  
Foucault clearly promotes general history over total history, however, it is 
unclear how proponents of general histories would cease to make the same sort of 
claims to epistemic truth that total histories are charged with. The scale is clearly a point 
of distinction; however, this distinction only makes sense insofar as total histories 
continue to circulate. In this way, Foucault’s advocacy for general history consists of a 
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deeply relativizing gesture meant to ward off truth claims. In The Need for Theory in 
History, Koselleck observes that “all metahistorical categories will change into historical 
statements” (PCH, 3). In the case of general versus total history, the latter’s metahistorical 
claims are just as historical as the former’s, despite appearances or claims to the 
contrary. While the dispersive effect of general histories might contradict the unifying 
effects of total histories, this is due to the fact that the former replaces the latter.  
Discontinuity in history does not, however, eliminate the possibility of 
teleological readings of historical events. To borrow an example from the French 
historian Roger Chartier, we can consider the fact that all ‘events’ organized in relation 
to the French revolution risk being read as necessary developments spurred on by the 
progress of enlightenment reason. By this I mean to indicate that the general theme 
which is used to organize events runs the risk of providing an exhaustive explanation 
for them, presenting the outcome as an inevitable consequence of contingent events.   
Is the discontinuous method a substitute for teleological historiographic 
accounts? Foucault admits as much. He writes that “rupture is the name given to 
transformations that bear on the general rules of one or several discursive formations. 
Thus the French Revolution – since up to now all archaeological analyses have been 
centered on it – does not play the role of an event exterior to discourse, whose divisive 
effect one is under some kind of obligation to discover in all discourses” (AK, 177).  
Here, repetition wearing down the term ‘discourse’ risks obscuring the specificity of 
Foucault’s point. The French Revolution is not exterior to discourse; Jacobin ideology 
competes with other discourses at the time. Concepts like the ‘enlightenment’ risk 
coloring our reading of this period, making political or, of special interest to Foucault, 
clinical developments seem irreversible. However, writing histories of the period known 
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as the French Revolution without specific mention of the name is disorienting. While it 
makes retrospective sense to think of The History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic and 
The Order of Things, as counter-histories of the French Revolution, and the Enlightenment 
more generally, such a realization takes place at a level of generalization beyond the 
subject matter of any of these texts.  
Viewed historiographically, these archaeological works tend towards nomothetic 
description. A passage from Gilles Deleuze’s Foucault reads: 
But if it is true that the conditions are no more general or constant than 
the conditioned element, it is none the less the conditions that interest 
Foucault. This is why he calls his work historical research and not the 
work of a historian. He does not write a histoire des mentalités but the 
conditions governing everything that has a mental existence, namely 
statements and the system of language. He does not write a history of 
behavior but of the conditions governing everything that has a visible 
existence, namely a system of light. He does not write a history of 
institutions but of the conditions governing their integration of different 
relations between forces, at the limits of a social field. He does not write a 
history of private life but of the conditions governing the way in which 
the relation to oneself constitutes a private life. He does not write a 
history of subjects but of processes of subjectivation, governed by the 
foldings operating in the ontological as much as the social field. (Deleuze, 
116) 
Deleuze observes that Foucault’s histories are not descriptions of events as they 
transpired (or, in other terms, his works are not reconstructive). Foucault’s histories 
describe elements in terms of conditions, rules, and laws. What archaeological analyses 
purport to show, then, are a set of rules or laws detached from their speakers and 
situations. In examples, Foucault lends these rules or laws troubling proscriptive agency:  
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It is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within 
these rules that we speak, since it is that which gives to what we can say – 
and to itself, the object of our discourse – its modes of appearance, its 
forms of existence and coexistence, its system of accumulation, historicity, 
and disappearance. (AK, 130) 
The archaeologist, while promising a novel methodology, denounces the idea that the 
insight gained thereby is enough to be used as leverage against constraints and 
conditioning rules. The archaeologist is described as bound within an inexhaustible 
archive whose possibilities exceeds the archaeologist’s descriptive abilities. While such a 
situation may make descriptive sense retrospectively, that is, from a third standpoint 
which is beyond both the archive and the archivist, it makes little sense to adopt this as a 
description of the self-same subject conducting the archaeologist analysis. As in many 
other examples found in Foucault’s work, the powerlessness of the archaeologist in the 
face of the archive-as-law remains unconvincing due to the manner that creative human 
agency is evacuated.  The inertia which the archeologist faces indicates that archaeology 
shares similitude with the history of ideas far more than with history proper. While the 
Archeology of Knowledge depends on the methodological and terminological innovations 
of the Annales historians, it does not thereby become a full-fledged theory of history.  
Does it make retrospective sense to describe researchers as constrained by the 
limits of their documentary evidence – their archive? Yes, but such a position would 
need to rely on the principles of historical reconstruction, which would in turn entail 
some hermeneutic depth in regards to the status of the past. What is the past in 
retrospection? Is it a projection of memory coupled with a projection of the present into 
a future scenario, as some thinkers such as Heidegger, Gadamer and Koselleck suggest?  
Guzzi 58 
 
 
 I argue that Foucault’s view is divergent from the aforementioned for two 
reasons. First, Foucault’s account does not utilize mnemotechnic categories, as it does 
not hinge on an “anthropology,” as is found, for example, in the work of Koselleck: 
The categories ‘experience’ and ‘expectation’ claim a higher, or perhaps 
the highest, degree of generality, but they also claim an indispensable 
application. Here they resemble, as historical categories, those of time and 
space. (FP, 257) 
In contrast, Foucauldian statements have unmediated spatial and temporal 
consequences, for example: 
A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre – a 
principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape; a general 
history, on the contrary, would deploy the space of a dispersion. (AK, 10)  
Here, agency has no anthropological mediation, and the categories of time and space do 
not undergo an anthropocentric re-rendering.  
Second, Foucault repeatedly denounces the trope of past-as-origin, which is best 
expressed by Leibniz, who claimed the study of history allows access to “the origins of 
things present which are to be found in things past; for a reality is never better 
understood than through its causes” (quoted in HC, 35). Instead, Foucault often refers to 
the past as a terminus in its own right, by highlighting the myriad discontinuous aspects 
of the past.  Of great difficulty would be the attempt to reconstruct, from the set of rules 
and laws which make up the archaeology of a discourse, the basic units, elements and 
specific features of that discourse, without making these separate entities appear the 
same.  As we have seen from his disavowal of the histoire des mentalités, Foucault has a 
great distrust of reconstructive methods.  
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This distrust is not confined to The Archaeology of Knowledge, but is also found in 
other works. For example, in Lives of Infamous Men, Foucault states that: 
All those lives destined to pass beneath any discourse and disappear 
without ever having been told were able to leave traces – brief, incisive, 
often enigmatic- only at the point of their instantaneousness contact with 
power. So that is doubtless impossible to ever grasp them again in 
themselves, as they might have been ‘in a free state’; they can no longer 
be separated out from the declamations, the tactical biases, the obligatory 
lies that power games and power relations presuppose. (EWF, 6) 
Here it does appear that Foucault claims there is access to non-discursive elements of the 
past in traces. Such an admission is crucial for the description of transformation and 
change, which requires more than the succession or co-existence of limits described in 
terms of rules and laws. However, as demonstrated in the above quote, Foucault 
considers these lives to be inseparable from their constraints. Roger Chartier advocates 
for the analytic separation of practices from discursive practices in The Chimera of the 
Origin: Archaeology of Knowledge, Cultural History, and the French Revolution. He writes:  
Recognizing that access to such non-discursive practices is possible only 
by deciphering the texts that describe them, prescribe them, prohibit 
them, and so on does not in itself imply equating the logic that 
commands them or the ‘rationality’ that informs them with the practices 
governing the production of discourse. (OEC, 59)  
Chartier offers an example wherein the formal element of practice is retained through a 
discontinuity in discursive practice. His example is from a work of Alexis de 
Tocqueville, The Old Régime and the French Revolution, focusing on the transition between 
the aristocracy and the Jacobins. De Tocqueville’s thesis supports Chartier’s idea of “the 
Enlightenment as a sheaf of practices without discourse – in any event, of practices 
irreducible to the ideological affirmations intended to justify them” (OEC, 60). Here, the 
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practices of the centralized power completed the revolutionary education of the masses. 
De Tocqueville argues that “the government itself had long worked to make several 
ideas, since called revolutionary, enter and become fixed in the minds of the masses, 
ideas hostile to the individual, contrary to private rights, and friendly to violence” (de 
Tocqueville, 230). De Tocqueville argues that Louis XV taught the masses that “there is 
nothing so old that it must be respected, nor so new that it may not be tried” (de 
Tocqueville, 230). When the government sought to create roads, it “did not make any 
difficulty about taking all the land it needed for its projects, and knocking down all the 
houses that got in its way” (de Tocqueville, 231). By doing so, de Tocqueville argues that 
the government taught future revolutionaries “the little regard which individual rights 
merited when public interest required that they be violated, a doctrine which [they] took 
care not to forget when the time came to apply it to others” (de Tocqueville, 232). Here, 
it makes little sense to suggest that either revolutionary ideology was a clean break from 
the practices of the Ancien Régime, or that the Ancien Régime is totally continuous with 
the revolutionary government. Instead, a discontinuity in ideology is coupled with a 
continuity in practice. A complex example, to be sure, but one which affirms Foucault’s 
concern with rigorous attention to the particularities of historical transformations, one of 
the many types of “discontinuities” to which Foucault attests (HDD, 231). Tocqueville’s 
writings support Chartier’s thesis in this section alone. It should be noted that the 
teleology of enlightenment reason is supported in a subsequent section, which is titled 
“How the Revolution Came Naturally from What Preceded it” (de Tocqueville, 241, my 
emphasis). 
In Foucault’s commentary on the Annales historians, we can see a deep 
seriousness assigned to the methodological statements of historians, which he sees as an 
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aspect of the “methodological renewal of history in general” (‘Live’, 47). Given 
Foucault’s interest in rules, laws, or, in my terms, the nomothetic aspects of 
historiography, it makes sense that so much of his intervention in the field of history 
concerns problems of method. So much so, that Foucault uncovered hidden implications 
in the methodological statements of Braudel and Chaunu, criticized and altered the 
understanding of the twin concepts of series and event.  More radically, when thinking 
of knowledge in terms of law or condition, Foucault demonstrated “that there is no need 
to pass through the subject, through man as subject, in order to analyze the history of 
knowledge” (‘Live’, 49). In other words, through the two problems of history as a stage 
of consciousness, and the juridical apparatus surrounding problems of intent and 
motive, Foucault diagnosed an issue pertinent to historiography, which is best 
conceptualized in terms of teleological agency. While Foucault’s method of discontinuity 
does advance us toward a solution to teleology in historical writing, he does so at the 
expense of both individual and collective subjects, whose creative agency, caught in an 
entanglement of laws, rules and other noetic constraints remains unclear. If we follow 
Chartier in understanding the influence of these rules which govern discursive systems 
as non-causal, then we still only have half of a dialogue, so to speak.   
It could be said that my treatment of Foucault has focused on his attention to 
methodological claims, and in doing so, has failed to develop a more apt comparison. 
Perhaps it is the case that Foucault’s methodological statements are not mirrors of his 
historical scholarship. How would Foucault’s treatment of a historical event compare to 
a member of the Annales? Luckily, there are some events which are treated by both. For 
example, there is Foucault’s piece The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century, which is 
comparable to Braudel’s “The Eighteenth Century: Watershed of Biological Regimes” in 
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Capitalism and Material Life. I found this example fitting, as both Foucault and Braudel’s 
concept of ‘event’ privileges those sorts of transformations which are difficult for 
contemporaries to detect. The European 18th century is just such an occasion, as we will 
see through the course of this analysis. 
Braudel heralds the 18th century as the end of a brutally restrictive Ancien Régime, 
during which death and life were kept in a precarious balance. Reflecting on 
demographic statistics, he writes that “only in the eighteenth century did births gain 
over deaths, and this was to be the pattern regularly thereafter” (CML, 73). This 
triumph, however, is quickly tempered by its tragic pedigree, the history of famine and 
epidemic.  He writes: 
These then are the facts that go to make up the biological Ancien Régime 
we are discussing: a number of deaths roughly equivalent to the number 
of births; very high infant mortality, famine; chronic under-nourishment; 
and formidable epidemics. These pressures hardly relaxed even with the 
advances made in the eighteenth century, and then at different rates in 
different places of course. Only a certain section of Europe, and not even 
all of Western Europe, began to break free of them. (CML, 91) 
Braudel’s tempered optimism entails that the 18th century marks a conjuncture, a 
medium term transformation of a number of structural constants. It seems important to 
note, however, that Braudel’s explanation of the 18th century is a retrospective 
comparison. While the section endeavors to explain the 18th century, Braudel does so by 
reference to the period of 1400 to 1800. Hence, his analysis is meant to establish causal 
connections between remote times and places.  
 Given what we know of Foucault’s estimation of causal explanations, his analysis 
of the 18th century ought to be remarkably different. Indeed, The Politics of Health in the 
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Eighteenth Century opens by disparaging the effectiveness of a causal explanation of the 
period:  
No doubt it is scarcely fruitful to look for a relation of anteriority or dependence 
between the two terms of a private, ‘liberal’ medicine subject to the 
mechanisms of individual initiative and laws of the market, and a 
medical politics drawing support from structures of power and 
concerning itself with the health of a collectivity. (PK, 166. Emphasis 
added) 
Instead of a de facto casual analysis, Foucault frames the transition as de jure. He claims 
that here “is the emergence of the health and physical well-being of the population in 
general as one of the essential objectives of political power. Here it is not a matter of 
offering support to a particularly fragile, troubled and troublesome margin of the 
population, but of how to raise the level of health of the social body as a whole” (PK, 
170). Foucault sees the transformation as a consolidation of power, and the end of 
informal means of care. 
 In this essay, we can observe a curious reversal of Braudel’s claims. Where 
Braudel was confident to ascribe a number of technological, scientific and agrarian 
factors to the population increase, Foucault instead frames the issue in reverse order. He 
writes that “the sudden importance assumed by medicine… arguably concerns the 
economico-political effects of the accumulation of men” (PK, 171). Foucault offers the 
term noso-politics to describe this new form of knowledge, wherein  
the biological traits of a population become relevant factors for economic 
management, and it becomes necessary to organize around them an 
apparatus which will ensure not only their subjection but the constant 
increase of their utility. (PK, 172)  
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Between Foucault and Braudel, which is the relevant development of the 18th century? Is 
it the increase in population, or the intent to develop around this population an 
economic apparatus to manage disease? If we attempt to mediate this conflict, we might 
find recourse to distinct historiographic principles useful. Where Braudel’s intents are 
largely rationalist, Foucault’s commitments are more obscure. A pertinent difference lies 
in Braudel’s liberal use of what might be considered anachronistic terminology. For 
example, Foucault hastens to inform his readers that institutional developments mirror 
conceptual ones, where he writes that “the emergence of ‘population’ [and] its bio-
medical variables of longevity and health” are products of 18th century institutions (PK, 
177).  
 In a sense, this divergence stems from more than just distinct historiographic 
commitments, but entails political differences as well. Our reading of Braudel and 
Foucault, therefore, leads us to a juncture wherein we must apply our historiographic 
question: is history the study of people, or should such inquiry cede to the 
“antihumanist reading” of history (Cronin, 211)? Braudel, while he disparages the 
“overfed rich,” lists “regular invasions… not purely by beggars… but by positive armies 
of the poor” among the perennial dangers of the period (CML, 73;75). Yet can Foucault’s 
work, an unflattering ventriloquism of alarmists and reactionaries, really be said to have 
greater political currency? In my assessment, neither historian offers a preferable 
politics, unless we are willing to risk the notion that there is no gap between history as 
product of the intelligentsia, and organized political resistance.  
However, my appeal to this gap is temporary, as it is the subject of the next 
chapter. Our analysis of the works of Foucault has left some unanswered questions. 
What are we to make of the political claims of historians? Further, if we reject Foucault’s 
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antihumanist historiography, can we write histories of individuals without falling to the 
Scylla of a subject-centered historical account, rife with the rip-tides of providence, 
teleology and progress, or the Charybdis of structuralist inertia? It is possible to write a 
history wherein the programmatic concerns of the historian do not override either the 
evidence of her sources, à la Foucault, nor the diachronic dynamism of the source 
material, à la Braudel?  
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Chapter 3: Jacques Rancie ̀re: Politics, Poetics and the People in Historical Reconstruction 
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The previous chapter discussed how Foucault, one of the protagonists of French 
Theory, draws from but also distinguishes himself from the Annales Historians, 
introducing specific questions, both methodological and philosophical, relevant for 
historiography and methodologies of history. In this chapter, we shift our focus to 
another French theorist, Jacques Rancière. Here we are concerned with Rancière’s 
theoretical contributions to historiography, with special attention to those which follow 
from the course of our previous analysis. First, a word about Rancière’s oeuvre. His 
historical works include The Names of History, Le concept d’anachronisme et la vérité de 
l’historien, Nights of Labor and La Parole Ouvrie ̀re, co-authored with the historian Alain 
Faure. This chapter focuses on The Names of History, especially those sections which 
concern the Annales School. Rancière’s dual criticism focuses on the political acumen of 
the Annalistes through a close analysis of the textual strategies contained within select 
histories. So far our analysis has suffered from a lack of attention on politics, partly due 
to the focus on thinkers such as Foucault, who failed to formally attend to the political 
stakes of historical writing, at least in the works treated in this thesis. With our analysis 
of Rancière’s Names of History, we return the problem encountered at the end of the 
previous chapter, the gap between histories as material product and political struggle. 
Where an empirical assessment of this problem may resolve in the postulate that 
histories represent political struggles, Rancière’s detour through the concept of mimesis 
leads to a non-mimetic theory of poetics wherein political representation and political 
credential can be squared. I conclude that Rancière contributes to our understanding of 
the politics of historiography through his criticism of ‘history from below.’ However, it 
is also the case that some problems raised by Rancière’s historiography, such as those of 
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place, as well as the role of the historian, are also characteristic problems of the positivist 
historiography we explored in the first chapter.    
Discussion of Rancière’s pertinent critiques will require some prior engagement 
with Rancière’s political works. Political critiques of historiography found in these texts 
bear traces of Rancière’s ‘axiom of equality’ which states that “the same intelligence is at 
work in all the acts of the human spirit” (IS 18). Put otherwise, “people generally 
understand what they are doing and don’t need someone else to think for them” 
(Kritzman, 642). In matters of politics and philosophy, the consequences of this axiom 
seem straightforward and desirable. But what about matters of historiography? Much 
contemporary historiographical theory figures the historian as a sort of mediator 
between the reader and the voices of the past. At a glance, this axiom of equality seems 
to threaten the dominant mode in which history is written. Instead of studying the past 
through indirect testimony relayed by a historian, how would it be possible to have a 
history that upholds the idea that people generally understand what they are doing? The 
retrospective coherence and insight offered by historians into past events, transitions 
and long-term structures would be abandoned in favor of auto-ethnographic accounts. 
On the one hand, such a demand seems close to the histoire des mentalités studied in the 
first chapter. On the other hand, a competition between the historian’s voice and the 
voice of her subject calls into question the political currency of the history from below.8  
 
 
                                                          
8 In this chapter, I use the phrase ‘history from below’ as a catch-all term for social, cultural and 
political histories that take as their primary subject subaltern, marginalized and impoverished 
individuals or groups. The phrase ‘history from below’ comes from Lucien Febvre, and was 
popularized by E.P. Thompson in a 1966 review of the same name.  
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Old and New 
First, we must orient ourselves to Rancière’s theoretical work on historiography. In The 
Names of History, Rancière focuses on the Annales historians for the first two chapters. 
His concern is twofold, first, a comparison between the poetics of the ‘old’ and ‘new 
history’ – analyzing the language of Braudel’s Mediterranean, with the aim of separating 
the voices of the past from the historian’s ventriloquism. Here, Rancière cuts to the heart 
of the political stakes of ‘the history from below,’ developing a critique of 
historiographic representation of impoverished classes and marginalized voices. Known 
to scholars as the ‘history from below,’ this genre of historical writing focuses on 
ordinary people, rather than the subjects of traditional history. The early Annales 
historians, such as Febvre and Bloch, pioneered the “histoire vue d’en bas” in areas such as 
rural history and the history of popular belief (Febvre, 1932, p. 576).  
First, Rancière reports of the break between the “old tradition of chronicling” 
and the new history endowed with “the rigor of a science” (NH, 1). Rancie ̀re conceives 
of this break as an attempt by the new historians of the Annales to give a new rigor to the 
old equivocations and indeterminacies of traditional historical accounts.  As we 
analyzed in our first chapter, the Annales historians did attempt to build new 
foundations for history; these included research agendas, methodological criticism and 
interdisciplinary inquires. Some of these research agendas entailed a break with what 
we might call literary aspects of historiography, what Foucault opposed with 
discontinuity. Insofar as the ‘new history,’ variously advocated for problem-centered 
approaches to history, these historians distanced their own accounts from a literary 
procedure that had been disguised as an unassailable principle of historiography: 
chronology. In Rancière’s terms, the Annales situated themselves beyond the homonymy 
Guzzi 70 
 
 
which indexes “lived experience, its faithful narrative, its lying fiction and its 
knowledgeable explanation all by the same name” (NH, 3).  Henceforth, the Annales 
would transform history into a reinvigorated science, but, as Rancière claims: “the 
difference between history as science and history as narrative was necessarily produced 
in the heart of narrative, with the latter’s words and use of words” (NH, 3). Rancière 
introduces an important distinction between history as a science and history as 
narrative. Through the course of our analysis, we have encountered philosophers, 
historians and theorists who would place themselves on either side of this division. In a 
Kantian vein, Rancière proposes that the literary functions of history undergird and 
support the possibility of this distinction, insofar as it is the case that this distinction is 
directly supported by the adoption of an alternative set of vocabulary, writing 
conventions and styles.  Scientific history, dissatisfied with the indeterminacy involved 
in narrative, sought to use the conventions of the social sciences to validate historical 
inquiry, as attested to in the works of Annales historians such as Emmanuel Le Roy 
Ladurie, François Furet and the Chaunus. Much of Rancière’s historiographic criticism 
focuses on the manner in which history requires indeterminacy, whether this means 
borrowing literary conventions developed in fictional works, or relying on testimony 
whose factual content is in question.  
Rancière’s guiding question in the beginning of The Names of History could be 
restated as: What purpose does the ‘old history’ serve for the inauguration of the ‘new 
history’? While the new history appears to abandon the conventions of the old history, it 
ought to be noted that in its various guises ‘traditional history’ or ‘old history’ is a 
retrospective term at best. While the Annales agendas variously break with older 
conventions, this break is not complete, as evinced by the historians to which Annalistes 
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pointed as their precursors. Rancière presses even further into this debt, indicating that 
the new objects and methods of the Annales intermix with the objects and methods of the 
old history, namely, great historical figures, great historical events and the literary 
conventions of historiography. In order to analyze how the Annales managed this 
transition, Rancière proposes “a study of the set of literary procedures by which a 
discourse escapes literature, gives itself the status of a science, and signifies this status” 
(NH 8).  The first chapters of The Names of History are textual analyses of the Annales 
historians, represented by Braudel’s Mediterranean. Perhaps Rancière intended to 
criticize François Furet, who, before infamously announcing that the French Revolution 
never took place, famously proposed that historians attempt to “define the specificity of 
historical knowledge in relation to the social sciences in general” (Constructing the Past, 
12). In other words, Furet argued that not only could history be practiced as a science, 
but that historians ought to “give up being satisfied with the immense indeterminacy of 
their knowledge” (quoted in Kritzman, 13). What is meant by knowledge here? Is it 
ambiguity in the historian’s mind or in the historian’s object?  
Let us further analyze the ambiguity of historical facts. Historians have methods 
for removing ambiguity, but in order to do so, they must rely on the scientific 
conventions of other disciplines. As seen in our first chapter, the nomothetic and 
idiographic antimony developed around this disciplinary dilemma. The division 
between singular fact and general law is, for Rancie ̀re, a matter of which discipline 
histories lean on. He writes that histories are either  
… a ‘factual’ history, clinging to what the poetic and rhetorical tradition 
designates as characters and actions worthy of interest. Or, to escape this 
tradition, it has to devote itself to the search for the laws of history, which 
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are in fact that laws of other science: theology one upon a time, sociology 
or economics in the modern era. (PL, 175)  
Rancière introduces literature as the third term of this either/or. As stated in The Names 
of History, story and history are both histoire in French. While modern histories, like 
those exempla from the Annales, use conventions of sociology and economics in order to 
give scientific legitimacy to these works, histories informed by literary conventions 
“take on the risk of a certain intermin[acy]” (PL, 182). For example, Rancière points out 
that “biography does not happen without a certain indistinguishability between reality 
and fiction” (PL, 182). The locus of this interminacy, Rancière argues, is variable, as it 
corresponds to the infinite complexity of human lives. He writes that individuals relate 
their life to writing  
… as a testimony to a certain relationship between life and writing. It also 
means dealing with texts whose factual content is partly indeterminate. 
The stories workers tell of embarking on writing are themselves 
exemplary tales that refer to each other and repeat certain pre-existing 
models. They tell of the meeting between life and writing, not in the 
accuracy of the facts they relate, but in their very ‘falseness’: not in their 
inaccuracy, but in the way they are borrowed and displaced, attesting to 
the shifting of one mode of experience of language and life to another 
mode. (PL, 182)  
The final sentence attests to a motif in Rancie ̀re’s critical writings, the transition of 
conventions from one field to another. This transitive principle is used to argue against 
mono-casual and teleological versions of history. The fact that conventions are transitive 
between genres, styles, social groups, etc. is important for understanding Rancière’s 
position on the ‘old’ and ‘new’ history, and we will return to it in our discussion of 
historia magistra vitae. For now, it is sufficient to state that Rancière attests to 
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anachronistic appropriation as a kind of critical potential for revolutionary politics. For 
example, in The Names of History, Rancière argues that the Roman historian Tacitus  
… creates a model of subversive eloquence for the orators and simple 
soldiers of the future. The latter will henceforth not repeat Percennius, 
whose voice has been lost, but Tacitus, who states the reasons of all those 
like Percennius better than they do. And when the language of Tacitus 
has, as a dead language, taken on a new life, when it has become the 
language of the other, the language whose appropriation procures a new 
identity, the overly talented students in the schools and seminaries will 
fashion, in their own language and in the direct style, new harangues; the 
self-taught will in their turn take these as models, competing with the 
evangelical narrative and the imprecation of the prophets. All those who 
have no place to speak will take hold of these words and phrases, those 
argumentations and maxims, subversively constituting a new body of 
writing. (NH, 30)   
Tacitus is an interesting example, as it is unclear what if any impact he had on his 
contemporaries, whether politically or historiographically. His works were rediscovered 
and given new importance both by Catholic dogmatists —as Tacitus contains one of the 
few flattering contemporary accounts of Christ (Tacitus, xiv) — and Renaissance 
thinkers, who turned to his work for his political insights (Tacitus famously argued 
against constitutions of a mixed type). This example, like the use of the Roman term 
proletarian by Blanqui shows an affinity between anachronism and radical political 
transformation (NH, 93).    
Politics, Poetics and the People 
These aforementioned features of Rancie ̀re’s work: the incomplete transition 
from the old to the new history, the homonymy which indexes the similitude between 
literature and history, the allowance for ambiguity, and the transitivity of characteristic 
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conventions are all unique demands that Rancie ̀re places on a ‘new’ historiography. 
However, it is so far unclear how features of Rancie ̀re’s political thought influence his 
historiographic thought. I propose to clarify this relationship with reference to two 
works, the first of which is Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. In this work, Rancière 
positions “politics” and “equality” as antimonies, insofar as equality is represented to 
people through the law (DPP, 61). Equality, therefore, is not a statement of affairs, but a 
logic which can be used to analyze and declare its own absence (the norm and scandal) 
from the state of affairs known as politics (or ‘the police’ in Rancière’s terminology). 
Politics, within Rancière’s lexicon, indicates an “activity antagonistic to policing” 
whereby those who have no part in the ‘police order’ find community in the injustice of 
their exclusion.  
 How do we apply thoughts which orbit political philosophy to historiography? 
Rancière states that “politics is always at work on the gap that makes equality consist 
solely in the figure of the wrong” (DPP, 62). Hence, the problem of representation is 
doubly involved in politics, insofar as “the gap” is the result of the continuing failure of 
political representation; and insofar as equality finds sole representation in “the figure” 
of those who are deprived by this failure. Rancière’s thoughts on political philosophy 
find application to historiography also around these problems of representation. The 
short essay “‘Le Social’: The Lost Tradition in French Labour History” focuses on the gap 
between working class movements and social histories of mass movements. As Rancière 
states, “it is not evident that working-class militants felt the need for their own history” 
(PHST, 268). Rather, it seems to be a false assumption that the history of a movement is 
primarily intended to be read by the proponents of those movements. This is another 
version of the ‘dominant ideology thesis,’ which, when applied to historiography, 
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results in the (common) thought that histories are written in order to provide insights 
which escaped those individuals who are the subject of that history. Rancie ̀re’s political 
maxim of the equality of speakers finds its application in decoupling social history as an 
intellectual product from organized working-class movements. Historians, such as Le 
Roy Ladurie, who were once members of the communist party, produced “static” 
histories, which Rancière claims “succeeded in taking the place of historical materialism. 
It produced an ideology… denying any real change from below” (PHST, 272). We find 
the “politics” of historiography, not in similitude with the actions represented therein, 
but rather, at a distance from this representation, and in the gap between these histories 
and the movements with which they share a simulated acumen.  
Now, we can continue with our reading of The Names of History. First, we will 
analyze and assess Rancie ̀re’s analytic of poetics. Next, we will analyze Rancie ̀re’s 
critique of the politics of historiography.  
Roland Barthes’ The Discourse of History demonstrates a technique for the 
rhetorical analysis of historiography. In the course of his analysis, Barthes demonstrates 
that several techniques used in literature are also found in the work of classical 
historians. The discourse analyst looks for “the shifters (in Jakobson’s sense of the term), 
which assure the transition from the utterance to the act of uttering;” of which he 
mentions two types (‘Comparative Criticism,’ 7). The first, listening, is signaled by 
phrases “of the type as as I have heard, or to my knowledge” signaling the intervention of 
the historian or author into the event reported.   The second is a catch-all category for the 
historian’s explicit signs of organization; “the second type of shifter comprises all the 
explicit signs whereby the utterer – in this case, the historian – organizes his own 
discourse, taking up the thread or modifying his approach in some way in the course of 
Guzzi 76 
 
 
narration” (‘Comparative Criticism,’ 8). Barthes argues that in classical histories, 
historians use these shifters for several reasons. They allow a historian to signal their 
own voice and differentiate various aspects of temporal sequence; they lend contours to 
narrative and allow historians to break from a totally linear sequence of events. Shifters 
function to temporally align the reader with the historian. For example, Barthes writes 
that  
This type of discourse – though linear in its material form – when it is 
face to face with historical time, undertakes the role of amplifying the 
depth of that time. We become aware of what we might call a zig-zag or 
saw-toothed history. A good example is Herodotus, who turns back to 
the ancestors of a newcomer, and then returns to his point of departure to 
proceed a little further – and then starts the whole process all over again 
with the next newcomer. (‘Comparative Criticism,’ 9) 
Readers understand turns back, proceed and return not in the spatial register, but in the 
temporal register. These text effects are the same convention in literature or in history. 
We should note that Barthes’ reflections are based on classical historical accounts, such 
that his observations about the regularities of historical discourse may not apply if we 
were to analyze the Annales historians. 
Rancière’s analysis is indebted to Barthes’ focus on the use of shifters. In The 
Names of History, he writes that in the new history,  
The casting of the narrative in the present tense renders its powers of 
assertion analogous to those of discourse. The event and its explanation, 
the law and its illustration, are given in the same system of the present. 
(NH, 14)  
In other words, Rancière claims that within the new history, the old poetics of shifters 
are abandoned, or, at least all occurrences are held to be synchronic. There are no 
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linguistic indications of a temporal shift. As an example, he offers a passage from 
Braudel’s Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800: 
‘There is another rule with no exceptions: epidemics jump from one 
human mass to another. Alonso Montecuccoli, whom the Grand Duke of 
Tuscany sends to England, ... will cross from Boulogne and not from 
Calais, where the English plague ... has just arrived.’ The tense of the rule 
is identical to the tense of the event. And this identity goes along with 
another, that of the literal and the figurative: the ambassador who crosses 
the Channel and the epidemic that jumps have the same modality of 
existence. (NH, 15) 
Within this passage, there is a noticeable lack of those shifters which Barthes indicated 
are so central to expressing complex temporal relationships. From the standpoint of a 
poetic analysis of the text, this new equivocation produces a novel kind of 
indiscernibility than those found in ‘the old history.’ Rancière writes: 
The new history aims to assure the primacy of things over words and to 
circumscribe the possibilities of each time period. But this discernment of 
the weight of things and the specificity of tenses can function only on the 
basis of a poetical principle of indiscernibility. The true discourse on the 
advance of the epidemics and the fictitious narrative of the meeting 
between the king and the historian stem from the same syntax and the 
same ontology. The literal and the figurative are seemingly indiscernible 
here, and the present in which the king receives the historian responds to 
the future past of the ambassador's voyage. (NH, 15) 
In attempting to distance their accounts from the ‘old history’s’ focus on events, the 
Annales historians did attempt to describe time periods in terms of their possibilities: 
whether this meant describing structural material constraints or mentalités.  Within this 
subjunctive register, the historian ‘enters’ into the scene in the sense that there are no 
explicit linguistic indications of a temporal division between the king and the historian. 
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Hence, the old ambiguities of histoire resurface within the Annales, such that the 
historian’s intervention becomes the historian’s testimony.  
How does Braudel fare as a historical witness? Rancière playfully compares him 
to a near contemporary of Phillipe – Thomas Hobbes. Rancière focuses on Hobbes’ 
accounts of the causes of sedition found in De cive and Leviathan. In Rancière’s account of 
Hobbes, the words of the poor are given revolutionary agency, and are portrayed as an 
object of fear, primarily in the form of sedition. Rancie ̀re remarks: 
The theoretical and political evil, for Hobbes and the tradition he opens, 
may be identified in this way: the proliferation of borrowed names, of 
names that do not resemble any reality, and that kill because they are 
poorly used, used by people who should not handle them, who have torn 
from their context to apply them in a situation that has nothing to do with 
their context. (NH, 21)  
Like in his analysis of Tactius, Rancière emphasizes the revolutionary agency found in 
appropriating names.9 
                                                          
9 Sylvain Lazarus, in L’anthropologie du nom, raises similar issues which concern the stakes of names 
in the study of history. Lazarus indicates the importance of adding a third term to the objects and 
subjects of history: the space of the name. In doing so, Lazarus reserves an agency in the loci of 
names, similar to Rancie ̀re’s attestation of the agency of words (mots). In each, we find a space of 
possibility between the objective and ossified categories which engulf unique events, and the 
experience of those events. However, Lazarus proposes names as the basic unit of history, which 
places him at odds with both Foucault and Rancie ̀re, who propose no basic units of history (Badiou, 
2012, p. 87). An account of Lazarus’ L’anthropologie du nom can be found in Badiou’s Metapolitics 
(2005, p. 27-55.) A careful assessment of Lazarus, including an analysis of Lazarus and Bloch on 
the problem of Time and Politics (p. 19-26) can be found in Calcagno, A. (2007) “Abolishing Time 
and History: Lazarus and the Possibility of Thinking Political Events Outside Time” Journal of 
French Philosophy 17(2), 13-36. L’anthropologie du nom will be available in English translation in 
September, 2015. It would be interesting to determine whether Lazarus’ concept of historical 
sequence is like or unlike Rancie ̀re’s attestation to the appropriation of names à la his discussion of 
Tacitus.  
 
Guzzi 79 
 
 
 While Braudel underplays the significance of the words of the poor, both 
explicitly and by omission, the works of Hobbes prove that contemporaries feared the 
multiplicity of voices, that they were active political agents. This sort of agency reaches 
its height in declaring a new legitimate force in politics: “the same illusion, then, assigns 
the body of the king an empty name (despot) and gives the multitude a name that fits 
only the sovereign body, the name people” (NH, 20). The French Revolution 
consolidates this inauguration of a new sovereign body, the people. However, 
historiography represents this new sovereign body through abstract personification, 
“the subject of history became an object, or rather, a place, among other places, for 
objects of history” (NH, 95). Whether this abstract personification is the nation of France, 
the Mediterranean Sea, or the not otherwise specified archive, the subject of the new 
historiography, from Michelet to the Annales, becomes a place. 
 In Rancière’s terms, the subject-as-place places the new history at odds with the 
modern revolution. He writes: 
The modern revolution, whose birth Hobbes is witnessing, could be 
defined as follows: the revolution of the children of the Book, of the poor 
who are ‘eager to write, to talk of themselves and others,’ the 
proliferation of speakers who are outside their place and outside the 
truth, gathering the properties of the two great bodies of writing 
lingering within their reach, prophetic epilepsy and mimetic 
hydrophobia. It is a revolution of paperwork in which royal legitimacy 
and the principle of political legitimacy find themselves defeated, 
fragmented in the multiplication of speech and speakers who come to 
enact another legitimacy – the fantastical legitimacy of a people that has 
arisen between the lines of ancient history and of biblical writing. (NH, 
20)   
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Rancière’s description of the French Revolution is essentially a transfer of names from 
ancient texts to modern groups. In terms of names, the transition takes place between 
the “proper names of chronicling” to the “common names of science” (NH, 96). This a 
way of discussing the French revolution as a ‘text effect,’ and the transfer of conventions 
of ancient history (specifically names like proletarian, the wretched of the earth, etc.) and 
prophetic, universalistic tone of oracular biblical writing found in documents like the 
declaration of the rights of man, and the declaration of independence. This transition 
reaches a dramatic height at the end of Braudel’s Mediterranean.  
 In Braudel’s Mediterranean, the death of king Philip II is written as a metonymy. 
Rancière writes that “the displaced death of Philip II metaphorizes the death of a certain 
type of history, that of events and kings. The theoretical event on which this book closes 
is this: that the death of the king no longer constitutes an event. The death of the king 
signifies that kings are dead as centers and forces of history” (NH, 11). But does the ‘new 
history’ correspond with this political revolution? Certainly the ‘new history’ signals a 
transition away from the old objects of history: kings and the political elite. But does the 
‘new history’ also change the subject of history from the elites?  
What role should people play in historiography? Some analysis of this problem 
in the philosophy of history will help. At a glance, Rancie ̀re’s axiom of equality, which 
asks us to posit that “the same intelligence is at work in all the acts of the human spirit” 
has striking similarity to a principle from Vico which states that “verum et factum 
convertuntur [the true and the factual are interchangeable].” With these remarks, Vico 
influenced an entire lineage of Marxist historiography, insofar as the object of history 
was thought to be human action. Georg Lukács, in History and Class Consciousness, writes  
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Marx has recalled, in a quite different context, Vico’s remark to the effect 
that ‘the history of man is to be distinguished from the history of nature 
by the fact that we have made the one but not the other.’  … The object of 
cognition can be known by us for the reason that, and to the degree in 
which, it has been created by ourselves. (Lukács, 112) 
In this Marxist lineage, homo faber boasts a unique intelligibility as a historical object. 
Such declarations would make sense to Marc Bloch, who claimed that history was the 
“science of men in time” (HC, 27). Indeed, an entire section of the Annales, inspired by 
historians such as Michelet, would promote similar ideas through histories of mass 
movements, peasant life, and rural history.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, Foucault, in heralding the ‘death of man,’ 
considers “man” to be “a face dawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (OT, 387). While 
there was a strong connection to more humanistic analysis among the Annales, it is 
important to note that Foucault’s ideas did gain currency with some historians. For 
example, Le Roy Ladurie writes against “anthropocentric prejudice” (Le Roy Ladurie, 
17). Further, he states that “it is mutilating the historian to make him into no more than a 
specialist of humanity” (Le Roy Ladurie, 20). Le Roy Ladurie, however, does not think 
that history will completely abandon anthropocentric prejudice; the historian “can and 
still most of the time will be Bloch’s charming anthropophagous ogre” (Le Roy Ladurie, 
20). However, it should be noted that those historians who cling to Foucault’s anti-
humanism tend towards scientistic histories. In either case, the issue of the proper object 
of historical analysis is still contested by historians, and tends to define disciplinary 
affiliations.  
We can separate the previous problem, people as a unique historical object, with 
the problem of people as a unique historical subject. Foucault had many reasons, in the 
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previous chapter, for dismissing a generalized human subject, as did the Annalistes 
studying the histoire des mentalités in the first chapter. As it stands, these dissenting views 
point out a lack of consensus among the Annales historians and the theorists inspired by 
their work. We should note, however, that the latter problem as political currency, 
unlike the former. Various movements such as Alltagsgeschichte, feminist history, 
postcolonialism, and subaltern studies have stakes in the politics of historical 
representation, insofar as they attempt to account for contributions made by people who 
were ignored by earlier forms of historiography.10 
Each contemporary historiographic movement from below disrupts the Ancien 
Régime’s historico-didactic paradigm of historia magistra vitae. As Koselleck writes in 
Futures Past, historia magistra vitae held that “history can instruct its contemporaries or 
their descendants on how to become more prudent or relatively better, but only as long 
as the given assumptions and conditions are fundamentally the same” (FP, 28). With 
such a philosophy of history, the past was considered “a continuous space of potential 
experience,” which could be used for didactic purposes (FP, 28). Here, the subject and 
object of history coincided, with an elitist political register. Machiavelli’s Discourses open 
by invoking the didactic function of history, stating that his commentary on Livy “will 
comprise what I have arrived at by comparing ancient with modern events, and think 
necessary for the better understanding of them, so that those who read what I have to 
say may the more easily draw those practical lessons which one should seek to obtain 
from the study of history” (Machiavelli, 206). 
                                                          
10 An example is Ranajit Guha’s ‘On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India,’ Subaltern 
Studies I, Oxford University Press (New Delhi), 1981, wherein he writes that earlier historiographies 
of India “fails to acknowledge, far less interpret, the contribution made by the people on their 
own, that is, independently of the elite” (Guha, 2).  
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Of course, histories of elite politics leave many gaps, as Brecht expressed in 
Question From a Worker who Reads: 
Who built Thebes of the 7 gates?  
In the books you will read the names of kings.  
Did the kings haul up the lumps of rock? 
Within the 19th and 20th centuries, these gaps in knowledge were filled, partly in thanks 
to the Annales. However, the new ‘history from below’ emphasizes the agency of the 
historian over the agency of the historically represented.  E.P. Thompson, in Making of 
the English Working Class, wrote: “I am seeking to rescue the poor stockinger, the luddite 
cropper, the ‘obsolete’ hand-loom weaver, the ‘utopian’ artisan, and even the deluded 
followers of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity” (‘English 
Working Class’, 12). In the transition to the ‘history from below’ conventions from the 
heroic individual paradigm are applied to the historian, resulting in a sort of 
soteriological philosophy of history, whereby people from the past await the 
intervention of the historian. The new ‘history from below’ represents an incomplete 
transformation from the paradigm of the Ancien Régime, historia magistra vitae. 
Rancière works with an alternative model of historical reconstruction. Here, it is 
again necessary to turn to the works of Roland Barthes. In his Michelet, Barthes offers a 
version of historical practice which seems to align with Rancière’s. Barthes writes: 
For Michelet the historical mass is not a puzzle to reconstitute, it is a body 
to embrace. The historian exists only to recognize a warmth… the roots of 
historical truth are therefore the documents as voices, not as witnesses. 
Michelet considers in tem, exclusively, that quality of having been an 
attribute of life, the privileged object of which clings a kind of residual 
memory of past bodies. Thus, the closer the document comes to a voice, 
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the less it departs from the warmth which has produced it, and the more 
it is the true foundation of historical credibility. (‘Michelet’, 81) 
Instead of, like Furet, claiming that historians need to eliminate the ambiguity of their 
source material, or, like Ginzberg, highlighting the connection between the judge and 
the historian, who both interrogate and mediate, Rancie ̀re, in attempting to embrace the 
“excess of words” seems to be advocating a position closer to auto-ethnography than 
historiography (NH, 24). The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to this problem, 
which can be identified as a competition between the historian and the voices of the 
past.  
 In the Names of History, Rancière takes a unique stance on this problem by 
developing a criticism of Braudel. The passage which incited Rancière reads as follows: 
We must learn to distrust this history with its still burning passions, as it 
was felt, described and lived by contemporaries whose lives were as short 
and as short-sighted as ours. It has the dimensions of their anger, dreams 
or illusions. In the sixteenth century, after the true Renaissance, came the 
Renaissance of the poor, the humble, eager to write, to talk of themselves 
and of others. This precious mass of paper distorts, filling up the lost 
hours and assuming a false importance. The historian who takes a seat in 
Philip II’s chair and reads his papers finds himself transported into a 
strange one-dimensional world, a world of strong passions certainly, 
blind like any other living world, our own included, and unconscious of 
the deeper realities of history, of the running waters on which our frail 
barks are tossed like cockleshells. (quoted in NH, 17) 
In this methodological preface, Braudel expresses his distrust of those ‘eager to write,’ 
stating that this ‘precious mass of paper’ assumes a ‘false importance.’ Further, Braudel 
ascribes to the poor an ignorance of their own position, a historiographical version of a 
dominant ideology thesis. Armed with the tragic insight of posterity, Braudel asserts 
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that this world, like all others, is blind to circumstance. Clearly, he has in mind the 
categories of the longue durée, which escape the notice of all individuals caught up within 
them. However, it is important to note that this passage is not accompanied by sufficient 
evidence to scientifically support Braudel’s claims. Rather, the passage takes the form of 
a narrative. Rancière advances a criticism of Braudel couched in the language of Platonic 
categories, the mythos of the poor against the logos of the historian.11 He notes: 
What the historian here seems to propose to us, outside all determined 
reference, is a fable that unites the literal and the figurative of the 
amphibology: something like a Platonic muthos where the poor do not 
represent any defined social category but rather an essential relation with 
non-truth. (NH, 18)  
Braudel argues that the ‘mass of paper,’ while ‘precious’ works as a sort of red herring. 
However, Braudel’s methodological exposition is presented as a story, and so, Rancie ̀re 
argues, the conventions of literature are used to back the legitimacy of history. All of the 
aspects which are part of the historian’s judgement are left out of the narrative. It is also 
interesting to note the manner in which Braudel describes the writing of the poor, as 
eager speech.  
The Archive’s Pulse 
Rancière argues that the Annales do not portray words as active agents, when 
contemporaries, such as Hobbes, feared them. Testimonial information does not enter 
into a ‘history from below.’ Instead, Rancière portrays the Annales historian as a 
mediator, stating that “to pass from the history of events to that of structures, one must 
                                                          
11 These are also Vico’s categories in the chapter entitled “poetic logic:” “The word logic comes 
from Greek logos, which at first properly meant fable, or fabula in Latin, which later changed into 
Italian favela, speech. In Greek, a fable was also called mythos, myth, from which is derived Latin 
mutus, mute” (New Science, Section 401, p. 157). It is interesting to note that Vico’s discussion 
claims that logos is dependent on narrative, which seems to be Rancie ̀re’s main conceit.  
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separate the masses from their non-truth” (NH, 22). Hence, within Rancière’s criticism, 
the poor and the masses are held in analytic tension. He writes that “the poor, in the 
allegory of the science of historical study, represent the obverse of the ‘good’ object of 
knowledge, the masses” (NH, 18).  
The renaissance of the poor, which ought to be indicated by the new mass of 
paper, is instead substituted for the Mediterranean. If we accept Rancie ̀re’s view, that 
the nation, once represented by the land, is instead represented by the people, that the 
Annales history regresses in portraying the Mediterranean as the main subject. (Hans 
Kellner in Disorderly Conduct: Braudel’s Mediterranean Satire choses to read the work as a 
satire for precisely these reasons.) The political and poetic elements of Rancière’s 
criticism demonstrate that within Annales historiography, the masses are represented as 
objects through scientific means like demography. This retrospective version of history 
evacuates the critical potential found in the appropriation of names, in order to secure 
the historian’s epistemic certainty.   
Rancière’s rejoinder entails listening to the past as it is spoken - much like 
Barthes’ version of Michelet. However, the revival of the voices of the past borders 
between the two extremes of fiction and auto-ethnography. Ricœur observes:  
This granting of speech is particularly ineluctable in the case of the ‘poor,’ 
the anonymous, even when grievances, records lend support. The 
substituted discoursed is basically antimimetic; it does not exist, it 
produces the hidden: it says what these others might say. (MHF, 342)   
While, in Rancière’s view, Braudel’s historiography of the poor is bound to a number of 
Platonic categories bound to mimetic representation, the “anti-mimetic” history is 
relegated to the subjunctive register. History as if, not history as it was.    
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Rancière’s Nights of Labor, with the exception of the preface, contains a 
Benevistian separation between discourse and self-attestation. The narration takes the 
third person: “His name is Armand Hennequin, aged twenty-seven; born in Belgium of 
a French father, the chief customs collector there” (NL, 137).  Self-attestation, primarily 
found in the use of “I” phrases, is found only in quoted excerpts of worker’s writings, as 
in “I have already told you: I no longer have faith in time. I no longer believe in its 
organic missions. My existence is too twisted by its subversions” (NL, 232). 
There is a subjunctive reconstruction of the past present; “In this month of 
September 1841” (3). There is also the use of shifters within discourse to produce the 
‘zigzag or sawtooth’ effect to which Barthes did attest: 
When a caste of masters was not making him spend time in prison, 
individual masters employing him would assure him earnings of 2,000 to 
2,400 francs a year and readily entrust the management of their 
workshops to a man who cast such a spell on their workers. In the last 
prison he would enter, which the government of the bourgeois caste would 
let him leave only as a dying man, he would again ask his wife to send 
him “the illustrated Gospels my boss gave me as a present that fortnight 
when I went to so much trouble for his big order. That privileged 
relationship certainly put him in the best position to lead the battle for the 
recognition of those workers without anything to offer in the struggle 
except the risk of combat itself. (NL, 43) 
Further, the use of first person pronouns is restricted to quotes from the archived 
materials. In this sense, the ‘subject’ of the work remains the workers. Largely, the 
historian fades into the background.  
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At this point, a number of similarities between positivist historiography and 
Rancière’s revisionist historiography are apparent. First, there is the recourse to the 
subjunctive, found in Seignobos’ La méthode historique appliquée aux sciences sociales: 
The condition for understanding a social fact is that one represent to 
oneself the man or group of men who are its author; and that one be able 
to link it to a psychological state, very vaguely defined, perhaps, but 
sufficiently known to allow us to understand it – the motive for the act. 
(quoted in NH, p108n)  
Where the Annales developed an entire theoretical apparatus devoted to studying 
feelings, sentiments and interior states, committed as they were against the anachronism 
of positivistic historiography, the reconstruction of motive relies on a subjunctive space, 
an as if terrain in which to play out the past scene in question. Put another way, where 
the problem of historical place is given fresh reconsideration by the Annales, such that 
they virtually abandon the “non-place” found in the old histories, Rancière, by 
promoting this “non-place” as the privileged site of the marginalized and the voiceless, 
inherits the conceptual baggage which the specification of place sought to avoid 
outright.   
Second, and more importantly, there is the positivistic distain for the historian’s 
intervention or entrance to the scene of events. Rancie ̀re’s solution, as outlined in this 
chapter, is to lend the historian’s voice to those who were previously visible, but mute. 
What then, of the historian? Ought the historian to become invisible, as the discussion of 
Braudel’s interlope on Phillippe II might suggest? It seems important to note here that 
the issue encountered in Foucault’s Archeology of Knowledge concerning the place of the 
archaeologist is also present in Rancière’s Names of History.  
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While Foucault’s Archeology did not directly address the political stakes of 
historiography, Rancière’s Names of History does offer us two forms of political closure. 
First, his critique of the ‘history from below’ current informs us of the gap between 
histories as intellectual products, and those represented through those histories. Second, 
his anti-mimetic theory of poetics promises to secure the voice of the past in writing, 
which found application in Nights of Labor. From these two points, it follows that the 
political currency of historiography may be challenged by squaring the gap between a 
history as a material product and those whom it represents. Unlike Foucault’s 
Archaeology, Rancière’s criticisms do seem to allow for application. However, it is 
troubling that both accounts fail to offer an account of the historian which is neither a 
methodological regression nor an oversight. 
 By way of a conclusion, let’s take note that Rancie ̀re offers us none. The 
interlaced discussion, which has offered us insight into poetics and discourse analysis, 
politics and historiography, concludes with what many other theorists of history have 
noticed: that the past remains open. Open to interrogation, open to appropriation, 
inconclusive and indeterminate. No science or archeology is bound to radically 
transform that circumstance. Historiography, however, continues to amass insights in its 
transformations, methodological digressions and regressions. Our second order 
reflections on the ‘third level’ here draw to a close, without the aid of a fitting metaphor 
or didactic supplement. 
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Conclusion 
The first chapter was largely expository, insofar as it attempted to establish a 
number of conceptual, factual and historical bases necessary to acquaint the reader with 
my subject of research. Through an analysis of the conflict of the faculties, we found that 
the Annales historians were engaged in a reinvigoration of historical study, and did so 
by way of political and methodological justifications for their work. These historians 
decried the positivism, nationalism and documentary fidelity of previous historical 
approaches in order to develop a myriad of research agendas that stressed the 
importance of the historian’s intervention, used methods of social sciences, and sought 
explanation of phenomena previously ignored in history. For the purpose of our 
analysis, it was important to have this account in order to assess some aspects of 
Foucault and Rancière’s work which could be considered methodological regressions to 
positivism. Primarily, the problem of the place of the historian is resolved by neither 
thinker. 
 Within the first chapter, we first raised the issue of the “event,” which raised two 
interrelated problems. The Annales historians first found issue with events as the ‘emic 
unit’ of historical study, the result of an unspoken consensus of earlier historians. Their 
problematization of the event was radicalized in the work of Foucault, who arguably 
attempted to raise discursive statements to the level of an emic unit of his archaeological 
method. As we have seen, the issue at stake is the question of duration in the 
construction of historical works, and whether the duration unit ought to correspond to 
the faculties of human perception. Braudel’s longue durée, Rancière’s mot and Foucault’s 
énoncé each vie to establish a new elementary unit of historical study. As I am myself of 
the conviction that there are no basic units of historical study, it would be interesting to 
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explore these issues in a seminar setting. For this purpose, I have included a model 
syllabus as an appendix [See appendix A].  
Opposite to the problem of the basic unit of historical study is the old problem of 
philosophy of history regarding the status of laws. The Annales historians use of 
mentalités assailed the previously unassailable law of historical writing, chronology. The 
analysis of church time and merchant time in the middle ages, found in Jacques Le 
Goff’s Time, Work and Culture in the Middle Ages (29-42), is an especially pertinent 
example. There are also the achronological studies of Braudel.  
Foucault issued a radical challenge to the use of cause and effect, which ought to 
be considered the other unassailable law of historical writing. Roger Chartier’s On the 
Edge of the Cliff (esp. 57-60), treated in the second chapter of my thesis, contains the most 
well thought exposition of the matter I encountered in my readings, and his conclusion 
is worthy of reproduction: 
Thinking of the Enlightenment as a sheaf of practices without discourse 
(or outside discourse)--- in any event, of practices irreducible to the 
ideological affirmations intended to justify them—is perhaps the surest 
way to avoid teleological readings of the French eighteenth century 
(which are more persistent than one might think) that view if from the 
standpoint of its necessary end point, the Revolution, and retain in it only 
what led to that supposedly necessary outcome: the Enlightenment. 
(OEC, 60) 
While we found the evidence to support Chartier’s claim that De Tocqueville’s The Old 
Regime and the Revolution is an example of such a non-teleological reading impartial at 
best, it is clear that the sections of Braudel’s Civilization and Capitalism analyzed in the 
second chapter suffer from teleological tailoring. However, it is unclear if Foucault’s The 
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Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century is a preferable alternative, in that it merely 
reverses the two elements found in a cause and effect relationship in other scholarship. 
A sub-analysis of this problem is at work in The Names of History, where Rancière 
repurposes Michelet. I would restate this problem as whether or not people can be said 
to be retrospectively bound to structures and trends. Rancière clearly advocates for a 
sort of historical reconstruction which preserves the agency of the past, rather than 
merely protecting the past from condescension à la  E.P. Thompson. Within Rancière’s 
work, this issue is bound to the difference between text and voice, an issue familiar to 
students of philosophy from Plato to Derrida.  Rancière’s position is better stated by 
Barthes, who said  
The closer the document comes to a voice, the less it departs from the 
warmth which has produced it, and the more it is the true foundation of 
historical credibility. (‘Michelet’, 81)  
Where historical credibility was once founded on documentary criticism, 
Michelet sought to restore historical credibility back to vie. Where the legacy of 
Michelet is concerned, we find some similarities between Rancière and Febvre. 
Where Fevbre called for a history of psychological states, sentiments and 
emotions, which found application in the histoire des mentalités, Rancière saw fit 
instead to restore the place of the mot without scaffolding. There is a connection 
to be found between Foucault’s advocacy for a direct reading of archival 
statements, and Rancière’s restoration of the mot. While it is my position that the 
histoire des mentalités answered the concerns of Michelet more directly, there is 
something to be said for the rigor of both Foucault and Rancière in proposing 
alternatives to this paradigm.  
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Attempt at a Self-Criticism 
Now that the findings of my research have been condensed and stated, it is time 
to point out the issues contained therein.  
The first and most obvious concern to raise is the number of authors left out or 
given a marginal role in my work. In terms of theorists, why did I not include Michel de 
Certeau, Pierre Nora, Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Bourdieu and François Hartog? Each 
of these thinkers are natural fits for the subject material, and in many cases, more 
obvious choices than those thinkers I did choose to analyze. I now recognize places 
where these theorists would have enabled me to say more with less. Their exclusion was 
not calculated, but simply a logistical oversight of catching my reading up to my 
writing.  
The same can be said of my selection of historians. I regret at this late hour not 
including more of the works of Natalie Zemon Davis, as I originally planned to include 
the figure of Jean de Coras from The Return of Martin Guerre (p. 94 - 103) as a case study 
for my third chapter. The exclusion of Ernest Labrousse, the Chaunus, Michel Vovelle 
and Georges Duby was to conserve space, as I found I could explain similar ideas with 
other authors. Finally, I chose not to write on the generation of thinkers prior to the 
Annales, such as Henri Pirenne, François Simiand, Henri Berr, and Paul Vidal de la 
Blache, in order to give some chronological boundary to the scope of my research. I 
never intended to write an exhaustive history of the Annales movement, as better sources 
than I could hope to produce already exist.  
An apt criticism to raise is that the concepts explored in this work are not 
relevant enough to the dominant interests or trends of academic history as it is practiced 
today. Why did I study a set of Eurocentric thinkers? Why did I not see fit to include 
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more feminist, queer and postcolonial criticism?  In historical study, luminaries who 
anticipate future consensus are exceptions, not the rule. It is difficult to find fault with 
the past for not containing the innovations of the present. I now realize that I might have 
counter-acted these gaps by including more contemporary scholars. While I did manage 
to find the works of Sanjay Subrahmanya and Ranajit Guha, who applied Annales 
concepts to India, I do not consider myself well versed on the international reception 
history of the school. These concerns would have been difficult to integrate, although 
subaltern, feminist and/or queer theorists might find something of value in my third 
chapter.  
There are also the external constraints to consider. Theses at the Centre for 
Theory and Criticism are required to contain “formal statements of theory” and as such 
are required to reference the work of a small canon of authors. This is primarily the 
reason for the attention paid to Michel Foucault. Further, Theses in the Centre are 
required to meet a certain standard of interdisciplinary research. While I consider it a bit 
of a catachresis to call an individual’s effort interdisciplinary (rather than reserving the 
term to describe the research of a group on a particular problem), this standard was also 
formative for the course of my research, insofar as meeting it required some breadth.    
One unique aspect of my research is that I assembled and discussed the texts in 
which historiography is engaged by Foucault and Rancière, but also other “French 
theorists” like Roland Barthes and Paul Ricœur. While there are similar themes in these 
engagements, like causality, agency and representation, each have particular topics.  
While Ricœur, reflecting on the Annales and other French historians, figures them as a 
contribution to a theory of history, Foucault drew from the serial historians of the 
Annales in order to support his method of discontinuity. Foucault transformed some of 
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the Annales concepts in his own applications, such as the concept of ‘event.’ The impetus 
to theorize this concept clearly comes from the Annales historians, in their attempt to 
distance their own histories from positivistic chronicles. Further applications of this 
concept ought to take this impetus into account. Rancière, while perhaps engaging Furet 
above the other Annalistes, primarily reads the Annales in order to criticize their political 
claims, and their claims to scientific legitimacy. Rancière’s reflections on the politics of 
historiography have wider implications, which are beyond the scope of this research. 
We also find that Rancière’s criticisms did find application in his own historical works, 
like The Nights of Labor, which created a history from partial evidence, and which 
features the voices of those who make up those histories. I included analyses of the 
historical works of the Annales, Foucault and also Rancière in order to demonstrate that 
their historiographic reflections were not idle, and found applications which 
demonstrate their strengths and weaknesses in a more accessible manner.  
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Coda: The Antimony of Surface and Depth, a Sketch 
Throughout the course of my research, I was often occasioned to reflect on the 
differences I have found between the approaches of a group of scholars I studied in my 
first thesis, primarily German philosophers and theorists on the subject of history, and 
the theorists and historians of this work. 
The German authors I have studied tended to pay more attention to the figure of 
the historian, whether Benjamin’s Flâneur reflecting on the similitude of appearances, 
Nietzsche’s portraits of the monumental, antiquarian and critical historians, or Siegfried 
Kracauer’s  historian in the waiting room. Further, these authors were primarily 
concerned with the direct political effects of history, whether they found it lacking, as in 
the case of Nietzsche, or deeply troubling, à la  Benjamin and Koselleck. As such, they 
supplement a lack of concern with the place, position and figure of the historian in 
French thought. 
 In contrast, the French authors tended to pay far more attention to deep stratum 
of the historical past, often without direct relevance for the present. Often, this was an 
intentional gesture, as in the case of the histoire des mentalités, Foucault’s rejection of past-
as-origin, or Rancière’s mass of paper. Between German and French thinkers, each 
assumes a locui of history, whether the archive or the public square. I consider this 
difference to represent an antimony in 20th century historical thought, the antimony of 
surface and depth. Admittedly, these are general contours likely to admit of exception.  
However, it would be interesting to engage these differences in the course of further 
research, and satisfying to soothe my impulse to revise my earlier work and temper 
some of its more excessive claims.  
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Appendix A: Model Syllabus 
History and Theory: The Problem of Historiographic Determinism 
 
This seminar aims explore the tension between history and theory through three 
interwoven controversies. The main theme explored in these controversies is 
determinism in history. Do descriptions of structures and trends having binding status 
on the individuals and groups contained therein? How can historians realistically 
demonstrate human agency in their work? Is it possible to write the history of a 
problem, rather than the history of a period? In order to give sense to these questions, 
we will relate this overarching problem to three modules throughout the course.  
First, we will study the Annales historians, by exploring the controversy surrounding the 
research agenda known as l’histoire des mentalités. In this research agenda, and its 
applications, we encounter some new imperatives of 20th century historical scholarship: 
how to faithfully represent very remote historical periods as autonomous units? How to 
analyze phenomena through indirect historical evidence, such as emotion and 
sentiment? Can these insights enable us understand the present? 
Second, we will examine how the problem of causality found new applications in 
the work of Fernand Braudel and Michel Foucault. We will compare their research 
agendas, and then compare these agendas with historical works from both thinkers that 
describe the same events. Between these authors, we encounter two novel solutions to 
etiological problems raised by l’histoire des mentalités. Can we avoid causal determinism 
in historical writing through a description of structures and trends? How then, to 
describe changes and transformations in these structures? Is it possible to reconcile 
historical experience with historical transition? 
Third, we will read the theoretical work of Jacques Rancière. In doing so, we will 
apply our earlier findings to the questions of agency, trace and reconstruction found in 
The Names of History. Here, Rancière proposes a model of historical reconstruction based 
on of the impartial appropriation of the past for revolutionary means. Is it possible to 
reconstruct the past through impartial evidence? What does this tell us about the 
historical development of historiography? We will explore these issues by reading a 
work of historical reconstruction, The Return of Martin Guerre, by Natalie Zemon Davis, 
with special attention to the sections on our witness to the events, Jean De Coras. 
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1: Introduction: Does History Need Theory? 
Koselleck, Reinhart. "The Need for Theory in the Discipline of History." Trans. Kerstin 
Behnke. The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Ed. 
Todd Samuel Presner. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002. 1-19. 
Novack, George. “Major Theories of History from the Greeks to Marxism” in 
Understanding History 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/novack/works/history/ch04.htm> 
2: Survey of Literature 
Ricœur, Paul. The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1980. 
Module I – Mentalités and determinism 
3: Mentalités as Research Agenda 
Febvre, Lucien. "Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the 
past" & “Witchcraft: nonsense or a mental revolution?” A New Kind of History: 
From the Writings of Febvre. Trans. Peter Burke. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1973. 12-26; 185-192.  
4: Mentalités; Applied Agenda 
Ariès, Philippe. Western Attitudes toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present. Trans. 
Patricia M. Ranum. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1974. 
Barthes, Roland. "For a Psychosociology of the Contemporary Diet." Histories: French 
Constructions of the past. Ed. Jacques Revel and Lynn Hunt. New York: New, 1998. 
90-98 
Goff, Jacques Le. "Merchants Time and Church’s Time in the Middle Ages." Time, Work 
& Culture in the Middle Ages. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: U of Chicago, 
1980. 29-42.  
5: Mentalités and determinism 
"Mentalities: A History of Ambiguities." Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical 
Methodology. Ed. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1985. 166-80.  
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of 
Songs. Ed. Bernard Williams. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 2001. 34-35; 175. 
(§§ 7, 308) ‘Something for the industrious’ & ‘The history of everyday’ 
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Recommended:  
Ricœur, Paul. "Promoting the History of Mentalities." Memory, History, Forgetting. 
Chicago: U of Chicago, 2004. 188-200. 
Module II- Method, Structure and Causality 
6: Research Agendas of Braudel and Foucault 
Braudel, Fernand. "The Longue Durée." On History. Trans. Sarah Matthews. Chicago: U 
of Chicago, 1980. 25-54.  
Foucault, Michel. "Introduction” & “Archaeology and the History of Ideas." The 
Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Pantheon, 1972. 3-17; 
135-140. 
Recommended:  
Chartier, Roger. "The Chimera of the Origin: Archaeology of Knowledge, Cultural 
History, and the French Revolution." Trans. Lydia G. Cochrane. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1997. 51-71.  
7: Foucault and Braudel on Health in the 18th Century 
Braudel, Fernand. "The Eighteenth Century: Watershed of Biological Regimes." 
Civilization and Capitalism: 15th-18th Century: The Structures of Everyday Life. Trans. 
Siân Reynolds. Vol. 1. London: Collins, 1984. 70-91.  
Foucault, Michel. "The Politics of Health in the 18th Century." Power/knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon, 
1980. 166-82. 
8: History from Below and the Politics of Historiography 
Hobsbawm, E. J. "On History from Below." On History. New York: New, 1997. 201-16. 
Rancière, Jacques. ‘“Le social”: the lost tradition in French Labour history,’ in People’s 
History and Socialist Theory, ed. Raphael Samuel. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 267-72. 
Recommended:  
Lüdtke, Alf. "What Is the History of Everyday Life and Who Are Its Practitioners." The 
History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1995. 3-30. 
Badiou, Alain. "Rancière and the Community of Equals Rancière and Apolitics." 
Metapolitics. Trans. Jason Barker. London: Verso, 2005. 107-23.  
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Module III – Agency, Trace and Reconstruction 
9: Rancière: The Appropriation of Names 
Rancière, Jacques. "A Secular Battle"& "the Dead King" The Names of History: On the 
Poetics of Knowledge. Trans. Hassan Melehy. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 
1994. 1-23. 
Supplement:  
Tacitus. The Annals of Imperial Rome. 1.16. 
Hobbes. The Leviathan. Ch. 17. / De cive V.5 
10: Rancière: Historiographic Representation 
Rancière, Jacques. “The Excess of Words” & “ The Founding Narrative” The Names of 
History: On the Poetics of Knowledge. Trans. Hassan Melehy. Minneapolis, MN: U 
of Minnesota, 1994. 24-60. 
Supplement: 
 Aristotle. Poetics. 1447a.  
11: Rancière: Historiographic Reconstruction 
Rancière, Jacques. “A Heretical History” The Names of History: On the Poetics of 
Knowledge. Trans. Hassan Melehy. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 1994. 88-
103. 
Supplement:  
Barthes, Roland. "Death-as-sleep and Death-as-sun." Michelet. Trans. Richard Howard. 
New York: Hill and Wang, 1987. 81-97. 
12: Case Study; the role of Jean de Coras 
Davis, Natalie Zemon. The Return of Martin Guerre. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983. 
esp: 94-122. 
Supplement: 
Foucault, Michel. "Lives of Infamous Men." Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Ed. 
James D. Faubion. London: Penguin, 2002. 157-75. 
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